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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2000 election debacle in Florida, with its butterfly ballots,
hanging and pregnant chads, seemingly endless counts and recounts, and
court battles ending only at the Supreme Court, was heralded at the time
as a wake-up call to the American public about the weaknesses of our
election system. In the aftermath of the election, the public, advocacy
groups, and elected officials demanded reform of the election system.
Commissions were formed and lawsuits were filed. Finally, after almost
two years of debate and several negotiating sessions, Congress passed
the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).1 This new law led to up-
graded voting machines, the expanded use of provisional ballots, new
procedures for voter registration, the additional counting of ballots, and,
in some places, increased voting accessibility for the disabled.2
These various efforts promoted by HAVA, however, did not com-
pletely address the concerns raised in 2000, nor did they entirely avoid a
repetition of familiar polling place problems four years later. In some
states, the reforms and their implementation created new voting prob-
lems. These problems arose in part because HAVA does not require the
implementation of some of its provisions until January 1, 2006. 3 Voting
problems also arose because HAVA left some areas of implementation
f Fellow, The Century Foundation. Much thanks to Melissa Riess, a senior at Brown University,
whose contributions to this article were invaluable.
1. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
2. HENRY E. BRADY, AMERICAN ELECTIONS AND HAVA 4-7 (2005), available at http://
www.american.edu/ia/cfer/0418test/brady.pdf.
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15481(d) (2002) (voting systems standards); 42 U.S.C. § 15482(d)
(2002) (provisional voting and voting information requirements).
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vague and too much discretion was given to the states as to how they
would accomplish the goals of the new federal voting law.4
The disagreements surrounding current election procedures and the
implementation of election reforms seems to be caused by a philosophi-
cal divide that often splits along partisan lines. The divide centers on two
goals, which sometimes conflict: making voting as easy and as accessible
as possible for all Americans, and protecting the integrity of the vote and
the voting process against fraud and malfeasance. A different, though
related, split among election goals is the goal of making voting rights and
the counting of every valid vote paramount, versus the desire for final-
ity-having elections decided at the ballot box, not in the courtroom.
This latter split has emerged with greater force over the last few years as
political parties, candidates, and others have engaged in increasing
amounts of post-election litigation where contests have been close, or
where there are suspicions of major irregularities in the voting process
itself
This Article examines the problems revealed in Washington State's
election system as a result of its staggeringly close gubernatorial elec-
tion, and compares such problems to those encountered by other states in
the 2004 election. It examines the challenge of fixing these problems
through the prism of the ongoing debate over what values and goals are
most important when making election administration decisions. The
various values and goals of expanding voter access, increasing voter par-
ticipation and election efficiency, preventing voter fraud, ensuring the
count of every vote, and creating finality in the voting system are in-
cluded in this examination. Throughout this article, I argue that those
who claim choices must be made among these values are often trying to
force a false choice, and that where a genuine choice must be made, the
right to vote and to have that vote counted ought to be paramount to the
extent that the administrative process can bear. Under such a standard,
the right choice to make is usually very evident.
Part II provides background information on the development of
election reform law and election policy since the 2000 presidential elec-
tion. Most important are the provisions of the Help America Vote Act of
2002, which provided the framework for both the election improvements
of 2004 and the new difficulties that occurred in 2004. Part III provides a
national overview of current election reform, focusing in particular on
the effect of HAVA's requirements during the 2004 election on issues of
(1) voter registration, (2) statewide voter registration databases, (3) voter
identification, (4) provisional ballots, and (5) voting machines. It also
4.42 U.S.C. § 15485 (2002).
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discusses the issues of (6) felon disenfranchisement, and (7) voter in-
timidation and suppression through statutory challenges and other means.
Part IV compares and contrasts the problems encountered by Washington
election officials and voters with the problems encountered in other
states on the issues of (1) felon disenfranchisement, (2) voter identifica-
tion, (3) absentee ballots, (4) provisional ballots, and (5) voting ma-
chines. By comparing Washington's experience to the experience of
other states, it becomes evident that forcing a choice between administra-
tive values on some of these issues creates a false dilemma, and that on
other issues the balancing of values should fall heavily on the side of the
right to vote and have one's vote counted. Finally, Part V concludes with
a summary of how these problems, disagreements, and proposed solu-
tions reflect a larger philosophical and political debate over the compet-
ing values in election administration.
II. BACKGROUND: THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT
In a truly revolutionary move, HAVA's enactment was the first
time in American history that the federal government pledged funding
for elections.5 HAVA promised $3.9 billion to the states for election im-
provements; $3.1 billion has been appropriated thus far.6 In response to
the Florida election debacle of 2000, HAVA specifically allocated $325
million to states to replace punch card and lever voting systems.7
Other important provisions of HAVA include the following:
A. Voting Systems Standards
Beginning January 1, 2006, HAVA requires all voting systems used
in federal elections, while maintaining voter privacy and ballot confiden-
tiality, to:
1. Permit voters to verify their selections on the ballot, notify
them of overvotes, and allow them to change their votes and
correct any errors before casting the ballot, though jurisdictions
using paper ballot, punch card, or central-count voting systems
(including absentee and mail-in ballots) may instead use voter
education and instruction programs for notification of over-
votes;
5.42 U.S.C. § 15301 (2002).
6. NAT'L COMM'N ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS 10 (2005).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 15302 (2002) (providing $4000 for each qualifying precinct).
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2. Produce a permanent paper record for the voting system that
can be manually audited and available as an official record for
recounts;
3. Provide individuals with disabilities, including the blind and
visually impaired, with the same accessibility to voting as pro-
vided to other voters through the use of at least one Direct Re-
sponse Electronic Voting device (DRE), or properly equipped
voting system at each polling place, and to this end, any voting
system purchased with federal funds made available under Title
II on, or after, January 1, 2007 must provide accessibility;
4. Provide alternative language accessibility as required by law;
and
5. Comply with the error rate standards (the percentage of votes
lost by the voting system) in the federal voting system standards
in effect on the date of enactment. 8
HAVA also requires each state to adopt uniform standards defining
what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each certi-
fied voting system. 9
B. Voting Information Requirements
HAVA requires that a sample ballot and other voter information be
posted at polling places on election day. 10
C. Computerized Statewide Voter Registration List Requirements
Beginning January 1, 2004-or 2006 if a state certifies for good
cause that it cannot meet that deadline' '-HAVA requires states to im-
plement and maintain an interactive, centralized, and official computer-
ized voter registration list,12 accessible to all election officials in the
state, 13 that contains registration information on every registered voter in
the state.14 HAVA also requires the sharing of information between voter
registration and motor vehicle authority databases.' 5
8.42 U.S.C. § 15481(a) (2002).
9.42 U.S.C. § 15481(b) (2002).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(b)(1) (2002) (voting information posted on election day); 42 U.S.C. §
15482(b)(2)(A) (2002) (defining voting information to include sample ballots).
11.42 U.S.C. § 15483(d)(1)(B) (2002).
12.42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)-(2) (2002).
13.42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A)(v) (2002).
14.42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2002).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i) (2002).
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D. Provisional Ballots
Beginning January 1, 2004, HAVA requires that persons who claim
to be registered to vote in a federal election but who are not on the offi-
cial list of registered voters or who are otherwise alleged to be ineligible
to vote be offered and permitted to cast a provisional ballot.1
6
E. Identification Requirements
1. The Revised Registration Form
HAVA requires voter registration applicants to provide their
driver's license number or the last four digits of their Social Security
number. The state will assign a unique identifier to individuals who have
neither a valid driver's license number nor a Social Security number. 17
2. Mail-in Applications
Beginning January 1, 2003, HAVA requires first-time voters who
register by mail to present identification either when registering or when
voting. Accepted identification includes a copy of a current and valid
photo identification (if voting in person, the identification must be the
original), a utility bill, a bank statement, or a government document that
shows the name and address of the voter. Alternatively, the voter may
cast a provisional ballot."
F. The Election Assistance Commission
HAVA establishes the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),1 9
which is responsible for distributing funding, conducting studies, and
serving as a national clearinghouse for the administration of federal elec-
tions.2 ° While the EAC should have been created in February 2003,21 the
commissioners were not nominated and confirmed until December of
2003. This delay postponed the distribution of federal funds, which
meant that the EAC was unable to provide necessary guidance to the
states on issues such as voting technology and implementation of the
statewide voter registration databases prior to the 2004 election. How-
16.42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2002).
17.42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2002).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b) (2002).
19.42 U.S.C. § 15321 (2002).
20.42 U.S.C. § 15322 (2002).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 15323(a)(4) (2002) ("The appointments of the members of the Commission
shall be made not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.").
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ever, the EAC has slowly begun to issue guidance and guidelines on a
variety of subjects.22
By the November 2004 election, states had to (1) comply with voter
information requirements; (2) utilize, or apply for a waiver of, a state-
wide voter registration database; (3) comply with the voter identification
requirements, both with respect to requiring a Social Security or driver's
license number of all new registrants and special ID requirements for
first-time voters who register by mail; (4) provide provisional ballots;
and (5) replace or apply for a waiver for the replacement of punch card
and lever machines.
III. NATIONAL OVERVIEW: WHAT HAPPENED IN ELECTION 2004 ACROSS
THE COUNTRY?
With a margin of re-election victory for President Bush of more
than three million votes, 24 it might be claimed that the 2004 election
cleared "the margin of litigation." However, the appearance of a smooth
election concealed a range of troubling developments, ranging from sim-
ple human errors to prosecutable felony violations of federal law, such as
the destruction of voter registration forms. 25
Rather than representing a step forward in improving our broken
voting process, we now realize that the flaws and gaps in HAVA and its
implementation, coupled with a highly charged campaign season in
2004, led to continued obstacles for the American voting process. More-
over, concerns over the arbitrary application of voter identification rules,
lost votes in some electronic machines, long lines in minority-majority
precincts, questions about the neutrality of partisan election officials,
access problems to those with disabilities, and a host of other pre- and
post-election day issues have many voters continuing to question the
fairness of the process.
22. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2004 EAC ANNUAL REPORT
(2005), available at http://www.eac.gov/docs/EAC%20Annual%2OReport%20FY04.pdf.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2002) (provisional ballots); 42 U.S.C. § 15482(d) (2002) (voting in-
formation requirements); 42 U.S.C. §§ 15483(a)(1)(5)(A), 15483(b) (2002) (new registrants); 42
U.S.C. § 15302(a)(3) (2002) (replace punch card voting or apply for waiver); 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)
(2002) (voting by mail); 42 U.S.C. § 15483(d) (2002) (computerized registration system).
24. U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 2004 Presidential Election Results, http://www.archives.gov/
federal-register/electoral-college/2004/election results.html.
25. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, BALANCING ACCESS AND INTEGRITY: REPORT OF THE
CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ELECTION REFORM 3
(2005), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReformfbaicomplete.pdf.
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A. Voter Registration
During the 2004 presidential election, a number of problems arose
with respect to the proper completion and administrative processing of
voter registration forms. HAVA required that mail-in voter registration
forms include a check-off box verifying that the voter is a U.S. citizen,26
and that states notify voters who failed to "answer the [citizenship] ques-
tion" while also providing them with an opportunity to correct the form
prior to the next federal election.27 This new citizen check-off box re-
quirement was redundant because the National Voter Registration Act of
199328 already requires registration forms to include language above the
signature line requiring the applicant to affirm his citizenship. Nonethe-
less, some election officials decided to reject the registrations of thou-
sands of people who signed the affirmation but failed to check either the
citizenship box or a box indicating mental competency.2 9 Complicating
matters further, election officials insisted that registrants make any cor-
rections to their forms before the original voter registration deadline,
which in most states was a month before the election.30 Some voters
found themselves unable to meet that deadline.
This led to litigation in Florida where a group of individuals and la-
bor unions sued the secretary of state and the supervisors of five boards
of elections. In Diaz v. Hood,31 the plaintiffs alleged that the refusal to
process such registration forms was an abridgement of the Voting Rights
Act and the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. 32 Many Florida counties, as well as several states, proc-
essed forms in which the citizenship box was not completed; the plain-
tiffs in Diaz included voters who were not notified of their omission and
its effect until after the voter registration deadline, if at all. 33 Moreover,
the plaintiffs identified wide racial and ethnic disparities among voters
whose applications were deemed incomplete by elections officials.34
Nonetheless, the U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
26. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(4)(A)(i) (2002).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(4)(B) (2002).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2002).
29. Terry M. Neal, String of Electoral Storms Bear Down on Florida, THE WASH. POST, Oct.
20, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/issues2004/florida/florida
Magnify.htm.
30. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Florida Legal Services File Lawsuit on Behalf of
Broward Voter Disqualified From Voting Because of an Unchecked Citizenship Box (Oct. 14,
2005).
31. Diaz v. Hood, 342 F. Supp. 2d 111 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
32. Id. at 1113.
33. Id.
34. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by All Plaintiffs, Diaz v. Hood, 342 F.
Supp. 2d I I I (S.D. Fla. 2004) (No. 04-22572).
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many of the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.35 With respect to one plain-
tiff, the court said:
No federal or state statute prescribes a time period within which a
supervisor must notify an applicant that her application is incom-
plete, nor do Plaintiffs cite any law that would provide such time
periods. Kaplan properly notified [plaintiff] Diaz of her failure to
complete her registration application and Diaz did not provide any
authority in her Complaint that would have required Kaplan to han-
dle Diaz's incomplete application any differently. Diaz created her
own injury.36
In a similar fashion, the Secretary of State of Ohio ordered election
boards to reject any form submitted in person that did not include the
voter's driver's license number or the last four digits of the voter's Social
Security number. If the voter left the field blank, the Board would dis-
qualify the application. The registrant's form would be accepted only if
the registrant wrote the word "none" in the box.3 7
Issues of incomplete and faulty registration forms, and forms that
Boards of Elections failed to receive or failed to process, also arose after
Election Day 2004. Many voters who were left off registration rolls due
to faulty registration forms opted to vote via provisional ballots. These
provisional votes left election administrators with several unanswered
questions about the votes' validity, as the rules regarding whether and
under what standards such ballots should be counted were unclear.
38
B. Voter Databases
HAVA requires each state to implement a "single, uniform, official,
centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list.",
39
The registration list is to be "defined, maintained, and administered at the
State level" and must contain the "name and registration information of
every legally registered voter in the State., 40 The manner of creating,
operating, and maintaining these statewide voter registration lists was left
35. Diaz, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1116, 1120.
36. Id. at 1118.
37. Ohio Secretary of State Directive 2004-33 (Sept. 16, 2004).
38. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 25, at 8.
39.42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A) (2002).
40. Id.
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to the states.41 As of the November 2004 elections, fifteen states had
some form of statewide voter registration lists in use.42
Statewide databases have a number of potential advantages. They
can link to correctional databases and courts, making the process of tak-
ing felons off the list of eligible voters and restoring the franchise to ex-
felons more efficient. They can also link to social service agency data-
bases, which can help enfranchise people that have historically had low
voter participation rates by getting their information into the registration
system accurately and by keeping it updated. Statewide databases can
also help prevent duplicate registrations by more accurately purging vot-
ers who have moved out of the state and by quickly changing registration
information for voters who move within state. These databases also re-
duce the potential for fraud by expediting the flow of information from
health and vital statistics departments for the purpose of deleting de-
ceased voters from the rolls. Finally, a clean and up-to-date voter roll
reduces the number of eligible voters mistakenly omitted from the poll
book, thereby reducing the need for provisional ballots.43
C. Polling Place Fraud and Voter Identification
Perhaps the most divisive and partisan issue in election administra-
tion throughout the country is whether to require voter identification in
order to vote. In general, Republicans at both the federal and state level
view requirements for polling place identification as necessary to ensure
security. 44 They argue that those who would commit fraud would be
thwarted by requirements that they prove their identity beyond stating
their names or signing a poll book.
In contrast, Democrats at the federal and state level generally refer
to voter identification rules as a "solution in search of a problem, 45 since
there is very little evidence of polling place voter fraud and no evidence
41. 42 U.S.C. § 15485 (2002) (giving states discretion as to "specific choices" on methods for
compliance).
42. ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ASSORTED ROLLS: STATEWIDE VOTER
REGISTRATION DATABASES UNDER HAVA (June 2, 2005), available at http://electionline.org/
Portals/1/Assorted%20Rolls.pdf.
43. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 25.
44. See THE CENTURY FOUNDATION AND THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT,
ELECTION PREVIEW 2004: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND WHY (OCTOBER 2004), available
at http://electionline.org/Portals/I/Publications/E lection.preview.2004.report.final.update.pdf; THE
CENTURY FOUNDATION AND THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, PRIMARY
EDUCATION: ELECTION REFORM AND THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RACE (January 2004), available at
http://electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/Primary%20Education.pdf.
45. See THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 25; Karen E. Pride, Obama Voices Opposition
to Photo Voting Requirement, CHICAGO DEFENDER, Sept. 26, 2005, available at http://
www.chicagodefender.com/page/local.cfm?ArticlelD=2377.
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that it takes place in even a remotely broad or coordinated manner.
Moreover, while it does nothing to prevent or thwart the types of election
fraud that may truly occur-such as absentee ballot fraud-voter identi-
fication is an unnecessary burden that potentially intimidates certain
segments of the population from voting at the polls on election day. Iden-
tification requirements are also more likely to disenfranchise groups less
likely to have the required verification, such as the elderly, the poor, and
language or ethnic minorities. 46
By passing HAVA, Congress constructed a compromise between
Democrats unwilling to accept broad national identification requirements
and Republicans seeking more stringent identification requirements at
polling places. HAVA mandates that identification be presented at the
polling place only when a voter (1) registered by mail for the first time in
that jurisdiction; (2) is voting for the first time in that jurisdiction; and
(3) failed to include a copy of their driver's license, utility bill, bank
statement, government check, or other government document that shows
their name and address, or failed to provide the last four digits of their
Social Security number. If these elements are present and the voter fails
to present a valid form of identification, HAVA mandates that the voter
may only vote by provisional ballot, which is counted if the voter is later
determined eligible to vote under state law.4 7
In 2000, eleven states required voters to provide verification of
their identity before voting. Four states allowed voter identification as an
option for poll workers or allowed localities to establish their own rules.
Nine states required a signature match, while eighteen required the
voter's signature in a poll book. In nine states, voters were asked to state
their names.48
The passage of HAVA, coupled with the flurry of state legislation
around the country following the 2000 election, led to a marked increase
46. In the early 1990s, the Department of Transportation estimated that 87% of the voting age
population had a driver's license and another 4 % had a non-driver ID from the Department of Motor
Vehicles. A Gallup poll in October 2000 found that 93% of Americans have a driver's license.
Therefore, 6-10% of the voting age population does not have state issued identification. "We have
not been able to locate information about the characteristics of adults who lack driver's licenses but
they probably parallel the characteristics of people who do not own automobiles: they are poorer...
or urban." TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERAL ELECTION SYSTEM, NAT'L COMM'N ON FEDERAL
ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS 77 (2001). A
1994 Department of Justice study found that blacks in Louisiana were four to five times less likely
than whites to have photo IDs. Spencer Overton, Voter ID Supporters Lack Hard Evidence,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/
soverton/ajc april8_2005.pdf.
47. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 303, 116 Stat. 1666, 1708-14
(2002).
48. THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, VOTER IDENTIFICATION (Apr. 2002),
available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/i/PublicationsVoter/20ldentification.pdf.
[Vol. 29:353
Competing Values or False Choices
in the number of states requiring all voters to show identification. In
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, HAVA's enactment
marked the first time any voter was required to show identification.
Lawmakers in Alabama, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Da-
kota and Tennessee, confronted with the necessity of updating voter
identification laws to make them compliant with HAVA, enacted univer-
sal voter identification. In 2004, lawmakers in thirteen more states de-
bated similar voter identification bills. 49
There are indications that the number of states requiring identifica-
tion will rise. In 2005 Georgia and Indiana passed the most draconian
identification laws in the country, requiring all voters to present govern-
ment-issued photo identification before voting.50 Arizona voters passed a
referendum requiring all voters to show identification at voting polls. 51
Thirteen state legislatures have considered voter identification legislation
in 2005, including many in states where bills had failed the year before.52
As in previous years, the debate in state legislatures over voter
identification has been divisive, partisan, and sometimes racially
charged. According to a recent report in the Atlanta Journal Constitution,
Lingering anger over a vote to require picture IDs at the polls
spilled over into a special Saturday session of the Georgia General
Assembly centered on the symbolic repeal of the state's Jim Crow
laws. African-American lawmakers, and some white ones, staged
walkouts in the House and Senate on Friday night to protest pro-
posed photo ID requirements that they likened to the poll taxes, lit-
eracy tests and other obstacles used to suppress black votes during
segregation. House leaders threatened to formally chastise or cen-
sure lawmakers who walked out Friday night, as well as a single
black legislator who continued the protests Saturday during "Family
Day at the Capitol." State Rep. Alisha Thomas Morgan (D-Austell),
an outspoken opponent of mandatory picture IDs for voters, used a
procedure known as "morning orders" to make a speech against
critics of her stand on the proposal. She took the podium before
House members voted to repeal five Jim Crow laws, including one
to give tuition grants so students who did not want to attend inte-
grated schools could go to private segregated schools. But Morgan
49. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 25.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417(a)(6) (1997), amended by Act of July 1, 2005, 2005 Ga. Laws
53 (allowing a tribal identification card in addition to other forms of identification, each of which is
issued by the U.S. or Georgia government); IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5(4) (2005) (stating that voter
identification must be issued by the United States or state government).
51. See Nicholas Riccardi, Eligible to Vote in Arizona? Prove It, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005,
available at http://www.latimes.com/la-na-arizona5nov05,0,5192166,full.story?coll=la-story-footer.
52. See The Election Reform Information Project, Voter ID Legislation, http://
www.electionline.org/Default.aspxtabid=473 (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
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refused to leave the podium when her time for her remarks had ex-
pired, despite repeated requests and slams of the gavel by House
Speaker Glenn Richardson (R-Hiram). Richardson later apologized
to the crowd of spectators for his display of temper and Morgan's
failure "to respect the rules of the House."
53
Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky) and Senator Christopher "Kit"
Bond (R-Mo) recently introduced federal legislation that would require
all voters nationwide to show identification. 54 The legislation would also
place the burden on states to provide identification to all voters free of
charge with money from federal grants.55
D. Provisional Ballots
The 2002 election reforms under HAVA included an important new
protection: the right to cast a "provisional" ballot that would be counted
56once elections officials could confirm its validity. However, because
HAVA was vague on certain aspects of provisional voting, provisional
ballots were treated differently not only from state to state, but even from
county to county. 57 This lack of clarity led to numerous lawsuits disput-
ing the circumstances under which provisional ballots should be used
(e.g., if a voter was flagged for needing to present identification) and the
circumstances under which they should be counted (e.g., if cast in the
wrong polling place or if the voter had requested an absentee ballot).58
In 2004, voters cast over 1.6 million provisional ballots, of which
approximately 1.1 million, or 68%, were counted. 59 In twenty-eight
states, provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct were not counted.6 °
In seventeen states, ballots cast in the wrong precinct but within the cor-
rect jurisdiction (usually the county) would be counted.6'
Despite predictions that statewide registration databases would
greatly ameliorate the problems associated with provisional ballots, a
comparison of all seventeen states that had statewide voter registration
53. Nancy Badertscher & Carlos Campos, ID Debate Gets Heated, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Mar. 13, 2005, at E5. Georgia has since passed this bill and the governor has signed
it. H.B. 244, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005).
54. Voter Protection Act of 2005, S. 414, 109th Cong. (2005).
55. Voter Protection Act of 2005, S. 414, 109th Cong. §§ 302, 297 (2005).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(4) (2002).
57. THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 25, at 8.
58. See James Dao, Ford Fessenden & Tom Zeller, Jr., Voting Problems in Ohio Spur Call for
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
59. THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ELECTIONLINE.ORG BRIEFING: SOLUTION
OR PROBLEM? PROVISIONAL BALLOTS IN 2004 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.electionline.org/
Portals/ l/Publications/ERIP 1OAprO5.pdf.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
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databases during the November 2004 election with those states that did
not reveals little difference in the percentage of ballots counted. In states
with databases, 65% of the provisional ballots cast were counted, while
in states without databases, 68% of the provisional ballots cast were
counted.62
E. Voting Machines
The 2000 election publicized vast problems with the nation's punch
card and lever voting machines. These machines are difficult to repair as
they age, and are prone to inaccuracy and losing votes. In response,
HAVA set aside one-time payments for states to phase out antiquated
voting machines and established standards for the machines that replace
them. 63 Many jurisdictions used their HAVA funds to buy computerized
Direct Response Electronic Voting devices (DREs) to replace their old
machines, and 2004 saw a surge in the use of electronic voting equip-
ment. Election Data Services estimates that the proportion of voters us-
ing computerized voting devices increased from 13% in 2000 to 29% in
2004. 64 An estimated thirty million voters used some form of DRE in the
2004 election.65
HAVA's standards addressed concerns about the accuracy of elec-
tronic voting systems by requiring all voting devices to allow voters to
verify their selections and produce a permanent, official paper record that
could be manually audited in a recount; nevertheless, the rush to adopt
DREs was not well received in all quarters. A group of skeptics, mainly
computer scientists, politicians, and members of the public, raised con-
cerns about the reliability of new computer voting machines.66 A large-
scale movement arose to require a verifiable paper trail for these ma-
chines that would allow voters to double-check their computer vote and
permit elections officials to conduct a manual audit.67 This became al-
most the sole concern with the running of the election system in 2004.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, §§ 302-303, 116 Stat. 1666, 1706-
14(2002).
64. ELECTION DATA SERVICES, NEW STUDY SHOWS 50 MILLION VOTERS WILL USE
ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS, 32 MILLION STILL WITH PUNCH CARDS IN 2004 (Feb. 2004), avail-
able at http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSlncVEstudy2004.pdf.
65. THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ELECTIONLINE.ORG BRIEFING: THE 2004
ELECTION (Dec. 2004), at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/Election%2OReform%
20Briefing%209.pdf.
66. Jim Drinkard, Push To Replace Voting Machines Spurs Confusion, USA TODAY, May 9,
2005, at A6.
67. See, e.g., Press Release, VerifiedVoting.org, More Than 200 Election Reform Advocates
From 25 States Expected in D.C. for Two-Day Lobbying Blitz in Support of Voter-Verifiable Paper
Trail (June 7, 2005), at http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5782.
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Just as damaging as the growing mistrust of the computer systems
was the backlash against them.6 8 States and localities that had planned to
get rid of punch card ballot machines, which are more prone to losing
votes and more frequently found in African American neighborhoods, 69
were stopped in their tracks. Tens of millions of voters, including many
in key battleground states, used punch card ballots in the 2004 election.70
F. Felon Purges of Registration Lists
Just before the 2000 election, the State of Florida removed thou-
sands of eligible voters, primarily African Americans, from the rolls.71
Unfortunately, in 2004, Florida and other states again encountered trou-
ble when it came to accurately adding and subtracting voters from their
registration rolls on account of criminal status. Florida was urged to
withdraw its purge list after media investigations revealed that the list
72included thousands of people who were eligible to vote. The list in-
cluded a disproportionate number of African American versus Hispanic
voters, and would have disqualified 22,000 African Americans (likely
Democrats) and only sixty-one Hispanics (likely Republicans).73
G. Statutory Challenges and Voter Intimidation
State statutes allowing certain individuals to file challenges to a
person's right to register or vote have long been on the books, but rarely
used in practice. 74 In 2004, the aggressive use of previously obscure rules
allowing for "challenges" of a person's right to vote was, arguably, a
new way to suppress the vote.
In Ohio, the Republican Party used the state's challenge law to pre-
emptively challenge more than 35,000 new registrants in mainly Democ-
68. ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM 2004: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND
WHY (Oct. 2004), at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/Election.preview.2004
.report.final.update.pdf.
69. See TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, ISSUE BRIEF: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, VOTING MACHINES, AND SPOILED BALLOTS (Sept. 2004), available at http://
www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/afamvoting.pdf.
70. ELECTION DATA SERVICES, VOTING EQUIPMENT SUMMARY BY TYPE AS OF: 11/02/2004,
http://www.electiondataservices.comNVotingSummary2004_20040805.pdf (last visited Nov. 13,
2005).
71. Robert E. Pierre, Botched Name Purge Denied Some Right to Vote, WASH. POST, May 31,
2001, at Al.
72. Ford Fessenden, Florida List for Purge of Voters Proves Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2004, at A 13.
73. Id.
74. James Dao & Adam Liptak, GOP in Ohio Can Challenge Voters at Polls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2004, at A 1; Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU of Florida to Distribute
Flyers Informing Voters of Their Rights if Challenged at the Polls (Nov. 1, 2004).
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ratic and minority communities.75 The challenges were made on the
grounds that postcards mailed to the new registrants were returned as
undeliverable.76 Challenged registrants were required, just days before
the election, to attend a hearing and prove their eligibility. This went on
in some areas until courts put a stop to it immediately prior to election
day.77
The Ohio GOP also announced that it would send people to the
polls on election day in order to challenge the right to vote of pre-
selected registrants. 78 This plan set off a rush of last-minute lawsuits,
conflicting rulings, and appeals, producing great uncertainty about what
would happen on election day.79 In one case, the plaintiffs called Ohio's
law a "Jim Crow-era" statute being used to disenfranchise African
American voters. 80 The Justice Department wrote a letter to the District
Court judge, telling her that challenges should be allowed. 8 1 The district
75. According to the plaintiffs' first complaint:
Challengers are regulated by Ohio law. Each party may have one challenger present in
each polling place. A challenger may challenge a voter as "unqualified" to vote. O.R.C. §
3505.21. Once a challenge is tendered, a lengthy process begins. The presiding judge
administers an oath to the voter. If the voter is challenged on the grounds she is not a citi-
zen, all of the elections judges must ask three questions. If the voter is a naturalized citi-
zen she will be forced to present proper paperwork or submit to further testimony under
oath. OR.C. § 3505.20 (A). If the voter is challenged on the ground she has not lived in
the state for 30 days preceding the election, all of the elections judges must ask eight
questions. If challenged on the ground she does not reside in the county or precinct, the
judges shall ask three questions. O.R.C. § 3505.20 (B) & (C). The statute also provides
that the presiding judge is permitted to put such other questions to the voter as are neces-
sary to test the person's qualifications as an elector at the election. O.R.C. § 3505.20 (
following (D)). The statute provides no parameters for this additional interrogation. A
majority of the election officials may refuse the person a ballot if in their opinions the
voter did not fully answer any question, the voter answered the questions differently than
the answers on the registration form or for "any other reason." The decision of the judges
is final. O.R.C. § 3505.20 ( following (D)).
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (No. 04-738).
76. James Dao & Adam Liptak, GOP in Ohio Can Challenge Voters at the Polls, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2004, at Al.
77. Miller v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2004).
78. Michael Moss, Big G.O.P. Bid to Challenge Voters at Polls in Key State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2004, at AI.
79. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,
and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming August 2005); Election Law
@ Moritz, Moritz College of Law, Swing State Daily Update (Oct. 30, 2004), http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/analysis/2004/041030.php.
80. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Spencer, 347 F. Supp.
2d 528.
81. Letter from R. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of
Justice, to the Honorable Susan J. Blott, Judge, S.D. Ohio (Oct. 29, 2004), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/spencer.htm.
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court judges said that the challenges were unconstitutional. One of the
judges stated the following in her ruling:
The Civil War ended in 1865. Only two years later, in 1867, the
Ohio Supreme Court struck down the practice of individually inter-
rogating potential African American voters at the polling place re-
garding their race. The vehicle used to pursue these questions was a
statute that permitted voter challengers to be posted inside a polling
place. O.R.C. § 3505.20 is the present day version of that statute.
For the first time in more than one hundred and thirty years, this
statute is once again being used for a racially discriminatory pur-
pose.8
2
Nonetheless, a federal appeals court ultimately ruled the challenges law-
ful.83
Democrats made plans to post their own people at the polling sites
to challenge the challengers on Election Day.84 In other key battleground
states, Republican officials pursued similar plans, filing challenges and
deploying challengers. In Florida, the Republican Party developed a da-
tabase of thousands of voters it wanted to challenge on election day,85
and in Wisconsin, Republicans tried to challenge thousands of regis-
trants-but only in heavily Democratic Milwaukee. 86
Additionally, blatant voter suppression and intimidation, mostly
committed by unidentified individuals or groups, took place throughout
the country.87
82. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Spencer, 347 F. Supp.
2d 528.
83. Summit County Democratic Cent. and Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547 (6th
Cir. 2004).
84. Lisa Cornwell, Federal Court Clears the Way for GOP Representatives to Challenge Vot-
ers 'Eligibility in Ohio, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 2, 2004.
85. See Gary Fineout, GOP Calls 925 Felons Illegal Voters, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 29, 2004, at
Al; William March & Garrett Therolf, Republicans Press Voter Challenges, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 30,
2004, at 14; Garrett Therolf, GOP Plans Challenge of Voters It Suspects, TAMPA TRIB., October 27,
2004, at 1.
86. Wisconsin Republicans Question Another 37,000 Milwaukee Addresses, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 31, 2004.
87. For example, in Nevada, employees of a private voter registration company doing registra-
tion targeted at Republicans ripped up forms filled out by Democrats and threw them away. Democ-
rats found that they had not been filed with the county as required by law. In Milwaukee, a flier
purportedly from the "Milwaukee Black Voters League" was allegedly distributed in African Ameri-
can neighborhoods. It read, in part: "Some warnings for election time. If you've already voted in any
election this year you can't vote in the presidential election if you [or anybody in your family] have
ever been found guilty of anything, even a traffic violation, you can't vote in the presidential election
... if you violate any of these laws you can get ten years in prison and your children will be taken
away from you." According to local media reports, Pennsylvania officials received calls regarding
leaflets on "official" county letterhead distributed in a Pittsburgh mall. The leaflets said that "due to
immense voter turnout expected Tuesday," Republicans should vote on Tuesday, November 2, and
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IV. COMPARING PROBLEMS IN THE WASHINGTON STATE ELECTION
WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY
The Washington State gubernatorial election was historic-no
statewide election in American history has been as close.88 After the first
ballot count, a margin of only 261 votes separated the leading candidate,
Republican Dino Rossi, from his competitor, Democrat Christine Gre-
goire.89 A mandatory recount brought the margin down to forty-two
votes, and the subsequent hand recount requested by the state Democ-
ratic Party gave Gregoire the lead with 129 more votes than Rossi. 90 The
ensuing litigation over the election results, giving rise to Borders v. King
County,91 subjected the state's ballots to a relentless scrutiny that laid
bare fundamental problems in the state's election system.
While no other election in 2004 was remotely as close as the Wash-
ington gubernatorial race, it is evident that many of the problems that
Washington experienced could easily have occurred in other states. The
results of the Borders trial provide us with detailed information about
Washington's electoral system. This Part explores the similarities and
differences of Washington and the rest of the country's election experi-
ences in the order in which they most heavily factored into the Washing-
ton State controversy.
In resolving electoral disputes, many contend that choices must be
made between competing values, only to opt for the easiest way out. In
many instances, the choice presented does not in fact exist or competing
values can be mutually satisfied. Disputes over felon re-enfranchisement
and polling place and voter identification illustrate this point. In other
Democrats should vote on Wednesday, November 3. And in Lake County, Ohio, some voters re-
ceived an "Urgent Advisory" on fake Board of Elections letterhead warning that any voter registered
through the Kerry campaign, America Coming Together, or the NAACP could not vote. See Steven
Carbo, Color it Wrong, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=8965; Daily Kos:
Voter Suppression Time (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2004/10/28/201853/53 (last
visited Nov. 13, 2005); PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, NAACP, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, SHATTERING THE MYTH: AN INITIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN
THE 2004 ELECTIONS (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_477.pdf, Tova
Andrea Wang, Election 2004: A Report Card, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=896 1.
88. All Things Considered Democrat Leads in Latest Washington State Gubernatorial Re-
count (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 22, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=424 1110.
89. Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, Washington State 2004 General Elections,
Statewide Offices, http://vote.wa.gov/generallstatewide.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
90. Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, Washington State 2004 General Elections,
http://vote.wa.gov/general/recount.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
91. Court's Oral Decision at 8, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
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cases, weighing competing values tilts the balance heavily in favor of
voter rights rather than other policy interests. The issue of absentee bal-
lots in the case of Florida, provisional ballots generally, and the alloca-
tion of voting machines in Ohio and elsewhere illustrate this line of rea-
soning.
A. Felon Disenfranchisement
1. Washington State
A convicted felon in Washington State is not allowed to vote while
on probation, parole, or in prison; until he has completed the require-
ments of his or her sentence; until he has paid all court-related fees; and
until he has had his right to vote restored by the state.92 Washington's
law requiring the satisfaction of legal financial obligations as a condition
to restoring voting rights93 presents a significant economic barrier for
many people. As a result, many individuals are unable to vote years or
decades after their release from incarceration. 94 In some cases, individu-
als are permanently disenfranchised.
According to the Washington State chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union,
[p]ersons convicted of a felony in Washington are required to obtain
a "Certificate of Discharge," in order to restore their right to vote.
Discharge certificates are issued by the court of conviction. Statis-
tics from the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) show
that only a fraction of the individuals released from prison have
been issued a Certificate of Discharge. The primary obstacle is their
inability to satisfy legal financial obligations. Since 1988, fewer
than 70,000 discharges have been issued. During the same time pe-
riod, over 200,000 individuals have been released from DOC super-
vision without a Certificate of Discharge. Those individuals must
petition the court on their own to obtain a certificate.95
The Executive Director of the chapter has also pointed out that "[t]he
state's current system for restoring voting rights is a morass that has led
to much confusion among both citizens and election officials as to who is
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.520 (2004).
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637 (2004).
94. Sam Skolnik, Freed From Bars But Barred From Voting, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
95. American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, Washington State Voting Rights Restora-
tion Stats, http://www.aclu-wa.org/ISSUES/votingrights/wavotingrightsstats.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2005).
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eligible to vote. ' '96 In an amicus brief submitted in the Borders case, the
ACLU stated:
[F]or individuals, the process for restoring voting rights varies de-
pending on the nature of the conviction, when and where the con-
viction occurred, and factors unique to each person's case. Govern-
ment responsibilities related to reinstating the vote are divided
among a number of agencies that do not always communicate well
with each other. Official records needed to restore voting rights are
dispersed among many different local and state governmental bod-
ies, each with its own policy for retention of records. 97
More than 150,000 ex-felons are unable to vote. 98
In Borders v. King County, both sides alleged that hundreds of fel-
ons had voted illegally in the 2004 election.99 The felons' votes quickly
became a central topic of debate in both the press and the court, focusing
on three primary issues: (1) under what conditions is it illegal for a felon
to vote; (2) whether the illegal felon votes affected the vote tallies and
ultimate outcome of the gubernatorial contest; and (3) why so many fel-
ons voted illegally.
Republicans produced a list of 946 names that they believed be-
longed to felons who had voted illegally in the 2004 general election;
most of the names on the list were from precincts won by Democratic
candidate Christine Gregoire 00 The Democrats submitted a similar list
of 743 names, mostly from precincts leaning towards Rossi.'01 In pretrial
arguments, Judge Bridges set the standard of proof for excluding an indi-
vidual illegal felon vote from the total election count as follows: evi-
dence would have to be provided to prove that an individual had:
1. Been convicted of a felony, not a misdemeanor;
2. Been convicted as an adult, not a juvenile;
3. Not been given a deferred sentence;
4. Not had his or her voting rights restored;
96. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, ACLU Provides Guidance
on Voting Rights, Submits Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Election Case, Supports Legislative Reform
(Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/ISSUES/votingrights/ACLUAmicusGuidance
.html.
97. Id.
98. Rachel La Corte, Groups Fighting For Washington Ex-Felons To Get Voting Rights Re-
stored, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 23, 2005, available at http://www.komotv.com/news/story_
m.asp?ID=37653.
99. Court's Oral Decision at 6, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
100. Gregory Roberts, Democrats List 743 Felon Votes as Illegal, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
May 7, 2005, at B 1.
101. Id.
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5. Cast a ballot in the 2004 election;
6. Voted for a gubernatorial candidate on that ballot.
10 2
Producing evidence to prove these elements caused the final list of illegal
felon votes accepted by the Washington Supreme Court to shrink consid-
erably. Many of the names ended up on the original list because of faulty
or incomplete superior court files that did not indicate sentences had
been reduced or rights had been restored. Inaccurate county voting re-
cords made it difficult to prove whether an individual had actually voted
in the election. Ultimately, the court found that 754 of the felons on the
Republicans' list and 647 of the felons on the Democrats' list had cast
ballots illegally in the 2004 election. 
103
After the court ruled on the standard of proof to define an illegal
felon vote, the debate shifted to how the illegal votes should be sub-
tracted from the final vote tallies of the gubernatorial candidates. In the
press, Republicans pointed to national studies of trends in voting among
felons that showed that felons were more likely to vote for Democrats,
while the Democrats argued that subtracting the illegal votes would re-
quire months of testimony from each of the more than 1000 felons to
determine whether they had voted in the 2004 gubernatorial election and
for whom. Because voting without the proper qualifications is a felony,
Democrats argued that succeeding in the subtractions would require the
listed felons to admit to having committed a crime in court, which would
significantly complicate the proceedings.10 4 Having the felons testify in
person was never a serious option. To date, there have been no plans to
prosecute any of the felons who voted illegally.
In court, Republicans brought in expert witnesses who described a
process of "proportionate deduction" in which illegal votes are assigned
based on the percentages each candidate won in a given precinct. Ac-
cording to this method, if ten felons voted illegally in a precinct in which
Gregoire won 60% of the vote and Rossi won 40%, six votes would be
subtracted from Gregoire's total and four from Rossi's. According to
calculations performed by the Republicans, this method of subtraction
would put Dino Rossi's vote total ahead of Christine Gregoire's.10 5
102. Court's Oral Decision at 8, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
103. Id.
104. Kenneth P. Vogel, Theories Abound On Voting by Felons; Are Felons Red or Blue? Re-
publican and Democratic Experts Offer Conflicting Theories In Court Challenge of the Governor's
Race, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, May 10, 2005, at Al. See also Jim Camden, Politics, Math Collide In
Court; Judge to Decide How Votes in Governor's Race Add Up, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, May 23,
2005, at AI.
105. Kenneth P. Vogel, Each Party's Experts Claim Win; Democrats and Republicans Say
Their Formulas Decide Governor's Race. The Political Parties Get Professors to Study Who Won
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- The court ultimately rejected the "proportionate deduction" method,
however, because the data was neither a complete census of every felon
who had voted illegally in Washington nor a random or scientific sample
of illegal votes, but was instead overly weighted towards precincts in
which Gregoire had won. 106 Moreover, the "proportionate deduction"
argument depended on an "ecological inference" that Judge Bridges de-
termined was "not shown to be scientifically accepted as a substitute for
evidence or other scientific proof in these circumstances." 10 7
The only illegal felon votes the court subtracted from the candi-
dates' total vote tallies were those of felons who testified in court as to
their participation in the gubernatorial election. The court heard evidence
from four felons who had voted illegally for Rossi, and one who had
voted for the Libertarian candidate Ruth Bennett. Accordingly, four
votes were subtracted from Rossi's total, one from Bennett's. Apart from
these five votes, no illegal felon votes were subtracted because neither
party provided any evidence of how individual felons voted.10 8
Though the Republicans' case rested on the claim that "errors,
omissions, mistakes, neglect, and other wrongful acts" made it "impossi-
ble to determine which candidate received the greatest number of legiti-
mate, valid, legal votes,"'1 9 they did not allege fraudulent behavior or
claim that the hundreds of illegal felon votes were the result of an at-
tempt to influence the outcome of the election. 0 In its own investigation
into the validity of the list of 1100 names that the Republicans released
in early March, the Seattle Times contacted a random sampling of more
than 100 felons who had voted illegally; nearly all of them had not been
aware that it was unlawful for them to vote."' The large number of fel-
ons who voted illegally in the 2004 gubernatorial election seems to have
been a result of administrative error, misinformation, and faulty data-
bases. Given the complexity of re-enfranchisement in Washington State,
this is not surprising.
The Washington state legislature failed to pass legislation that
would have simplified the restoration of voting rights or automatically
re-enfranchise ex-felons, thereby reducing the number of ex-felons ille-
the Governor's Race. Big Surprise: The Democrats Say it is Christine Gregoire and the Republicans
Say it is Dino Rossi, THE NEWS TRIBUNE, May 14, 2005, at B 1.
106. Court's Oral Decision at 7, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
111. Peggy Anderson, Democrats Scold GOP for Publicly Accusing People of Illegal Voting,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 2005, available at http://www.komotv.com/news/story.asp?ID=35562.
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gaily voting. Nonetheless, legislators did enact a number of legislative
reforms with respect to re-enfranchisement. Perhaps the most important
legislation passed was the Enhancing Voter Registration Recordkeeping
Act," 2 which requires the statewide voter registration list to be coordi-
nated with other agency databases within the state, including the De-
partment of Corrections, the Washington State Patrol, and the Office of
the Administrator for the Courts. In addition, this new law does the fol-
lowing:
" Adds a sworn statement to the voter registration form about
penalties for illegal voting;
* Makes it a class C felony to knowingly register to vote without
the legal qualifications;
* Requires a quarterly screening of the voter database for felons
and other people who are barred from voting such as the de-
ceased, the legally incompetent, and people who have declined
to serve on juries due to lack of citizenship;
* Requires that felons be notified at the time of conviction that
the right to vote has been suspended and that voting before the
right is restored is a felony;
* Clarifies the process by which felon voting rights can be re-
stored;
* Clarifies the process by which a felon's right to vote is sus-
pended, namely, that after a voter's name appears on a felon
list, he or she must be notified that the right to vote has been
suspended and informed of the process for restoring the right to
vote, after which he or she has thirty days to respond, lest the
registration be cancelled;
* Requires that records be kept on previous successful appeals so
as to prevent repeated cancellations;
* Requires the county clerk to notify the Secretary of State each
time a felon completes all the requirements of a sentence; and
* Requires the Secretary of State to notify the appropriate county
auditor when a felon has completed all the requirements of a
sentence. 1 13
112. S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
113. Id.
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2. Rest of the Country
The issue of ex-felon disenfranchisement was largely neglected at
the national level until Florida's problems with the accuracy of their
felon purge lists went public. Now, across the country, attention is being
paid not only to the challenge of compiling such lists, but also to the core
issue of whether we ought to be disenfranchising ex-felons in the first
place. If nothing else, from an administrative perspective, it is becoming
clear that the easiest way to address the felon list problem is to narrow
down the names that must be on it and their current criminal status. In
this instance, the allegedly competing values of administrative efficiency
and the right to vote can be satisfactorily resolved.
Public and elected officials are increasingly recognizing that ex-
felon disenfranchisement is not desirable from a democratic or social
standpoint. Several states have reformed their felon disenfranchisement
laws to make the process for restoration of rights simpler, and some
states are getting rid of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws altogether. 11 4 In
114. The Sentencing Project has identified the following policy changes on felon voting rights
in recent years:
Alabama: In 2003, Governor Riley signed into law a bill that permits most felons to apply for a
certificate of eligibility to register to vote after completing their sentence.
Connecticut: In May 2001, Governor Rowland signed into law a bill that extends voting rights to
felons on probation. The law is expected to make 36,000 persons eligible to vote.
Delaware: Until recently, Delaware imposed a lifetime voting ban for felons. In June 2000, the
General Assembly passed a constitutional amendment restoring voting rights to some ex-felons five
years after the completion of their sentence.
Florida: The Brennan Center and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law have a vot-
ing rights case pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida challenging the
constitutionality of the voting laws that disenfranchise ex-felons.
Iowa: Governor Vilsack issued an executive order in 2005 automatically restoring the voting
rights of all ex-felons, a process that will continue on a monthly basis upon completion of sentence.
Kansas: In 2002, the legislature added probationers to the category of excluded felons.
Kentucky: In 2001, the legislature passed a bill that requires that the Department of Corrections
inform and aid eligible offenders in completing the restoration process to regain their civil rights.
Maryland: In 2002, the legislature repealed its lifetime ban on two-time ex-felons (with the excep-
tion of felons with two violent convictions) and imposed a three-year waiting period after comple-
tion of sentence before rights can be restored.
Massachusetts: Until the 2000 presidential election, Massachusetts was one of three states that al-
lowed inmates to vote. On November 7, 2000, the Massachusetts electorate voted in favor of a con-
stitutional amendment, which strips persons incarcerated for a felony offense of their right to vote.
Nebraska: In March 2005, the legislature repealed the lifetime ban on all felons and replaced it
with a two-year post-sentence ban.
Nevada: In 2003, the state approved a provision to automatically restore voting rights for first-
time nonviolent felons immediately after completion of sentence.
New Mexico: In 2001, the legislature adopted a bill repealing the state's lifetime ban on ex-felon
voting. In 2005, a bill was passed that requires the Department of Corrections to provide notification
of completion of sentence to the Secretary of State's office.
Pennsylvania: A Commonwealth court restored the right to vote to thousands of ex-felons who, as
a result, were entitled to vote in the 2000 presidential election.
Seattle University Law Review
March 2001, New Mexico eliminated its permanent ban on voting by
those who had committed a felony." 5 In March 2005, Nebraska also
ended its permanent ban, with the legislature overriding the governor's
veto of a bill giving former felons the right to vote two years after com-
pletion of their sentence, parole or probation." 6 In June 2005, the Gover-
nor of Iowa announced that he would restore voting rights for all felons
who had completed their sentences.'17 Iowa was one of only five states to
deny voting rights to ex-felons for life. The other four states are Ala-
bama, Florida, Kentucky and Virginia.' Fourteen states now automati-
cally restore voting rights after release from prison, four states restore
rights after completion of parole, and eighteen states restore rights when
an ex-felon has completed probation." 9
While a small number of ex-felons may vote illegally, this is often
due to confusing rules for re-enfranchisement-at least part of the prob-
lem in Washington-and ex-felons' ignorance of their rights and proper
procedures. Alabama, Texas and Virginia have simplified and expedited
their re-enfranchisement procedures, resulting in thousands more Ameri-
cans being allowed to vote. When Texas removed its two-year waiting
period for felon re-enfranchisement, an estimated 316,981 former felons
regained the right to vote. 120
On the other hand, a recent report by The Sentencing Project on
fourteen states where action must be taken by an ex-felon to regain the
right to vote found "a restoration process that is frequently confusing,
Texas: In 1997, the Texas Legislature passed a bill, signed by Governor George W. Bush, elimi-
nating the two-year waiting period after completion of sentence before individuals can regain their
right to vote.
Utah: In 1998, Utah voters approved an amendment prohibiting persons incarcerated for a felony
conviction from voting.
Virginia: The Virginia Legislature passed a law in 2000 enabling certain ex-felons to apply to the
circuit court for the restoration of their voting rights five years after the completion of their sentence;
those convicted of felony drug offenses must wait seven years after completion. The circuit court's
decisions are subject to the Governor's approval.
Wyoming: In 2003, Governor Freudenthal signed a bill to allow people convicted of a non-violent
first-time felony to apply for restoration of voting rights five years after completion of sentence.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf.
115. N.M. STAT. § 31-13-1 (2001), as amended by 2005 N.M. Laws 18, now allows for resto-
ration of citizenship and voting rights for convicted felons.
116. L.B. 53, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2005).
117. Kate Zernike, Iowa Governor Will Give Felons the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2005, at A8.
118. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/I046.pdf.
119. Zemike, supra note 117.
120. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, IMPACT OF RECENT LEGAL CHANGES IN FELON VOTING
RIGHTS IN FIVE STATES (2003), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/UggenManza
Symposium.pdf.
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cumbersome, and not widely used.' 121 The report found the regulations
governing waiting confusing, sometimes varying with the crime commit-
ted. 22 For example, in Tennessee, the process for restoration of rights
depends upon whether the felon was convicted in one of five different
time periods. 123 Many ex-felons have no idea whether they are allowed to
vote. 124
A handful of states besides Washington have found evidence that a
very small number of ex-felons willfully or mistakenly voted in violation
of state law in 2004. The only state that seems to have discovered a sta-
tistically relevant amount of ex-felon voting is Wisconsin. The Milwau-
kee Journal-Sentinel claimed it had found a number of fraudulent votes
in Milwaukee and throughout the state, and a joint task force of the po-
lice department, the district attorney, the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney's
Office undertook an investigation. 125 According to the Journal-Sentinel,
at least eighty-two felons voted illegally in the November 2004 election
in Milwaukee.126 However, it is likely that most of these voters were un-
aware that they could not vote legally, as several Journal-Sentinel articles
have suggested. 27 In a telling example, the paper reported that investiga-
tors working with the joint task force found "two felons who visited their
probation officer on election day wearing 'I voted' stickers."', 28 As the
paper points out, felons who vote illegally are committing a felony pun-
ishable by up to four years in prison and a $10,000 fine.'2 9 It would
hardly seem that the risk in such cases would be worth the reward to
these individuals. The joint task force, in its preliminary findings, found
200 cases of felons voting illegally in Milwaukee, noting the following:
In order for such action to constitute a criminal offense, the prose-
cution must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the felon was
ineligible to vote under state law and that the felon knew that he or
121. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BARRED FOR LIFE: VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION IN
PERMANENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT STATES 2 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject
.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 3.
124. See, e.g., Jane DeFao, Many Felons Surprised They Get to Vote, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6,
2004, at B3; Sherri Williams, Many Felons Surprised to Learn They Can Vote, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 2004, at B1.
125. Greg J. Borowski, 82 Felons Voted in November 2 Election, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-
SENTINEL, Mar. 18, 2005, at Al.
126. Id.
127. Greg Borowski & Mark Maley, Review Indicates 278 Felons Cast Ballots Illegally in
State, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al; Greg Borowski, Voter List Lacks Key
Element, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2005, at Al.
128. Greg J. Borowski, Bad Vote Tally Revives Reform Debate, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-
SENTINEL, June 9, 2005, at BI.
129. Borowski & Maley, supra note 127.
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she was ineligible to vote. As a result of this standard, the task force
is proceeding cautiously in its charging decisions and is evaluating
each case on the individual facts. 130
The cases in Washington and Wisconsin underscore the need for
states that continue to disenfranchise felons to make the process of resto-
ration simple, and to ensure that ex-felons know their rights and how to
exercise them properly.
States should also take steps to actualize the potential of their
statewide registration databases in addressing these problems. Databases
should make it immediately clear who is and is not legally entitled to
vote on election day. Many states, including Washington, have already
taken effective action to do just that by building databases that are inter-
actively connected with courts and departments of corrections. 131
Unfortunately, some states have not succeeded in ensuring that their
processes for purging and adding felons and ex-felons operate efficiently.
A recent survey by the ACLU of the purging processes of fifteen states
with a wide variety of disenfranchisement laws revealed the following
information: 32
" One-quarter of the states surveyed compiled their purge lists
without reference to any legislative standards whatsoever, while
half the states surveyed did so using only an individual's name
and address;
* No state surveyed had codified any specific or minimum set of
criteria for its officials to use in ensuring that an individual with
a felony conviction is the same individual being purged from
the voter rolls; and
* Two-thirds of the states surveyed did not require election offi-
cials to notify voters when they were purged from the voter
rolls, denying these voters an opportunity to contest erroneous
purges.
There are a number of steps states can take regarding felon re-
enfranchisement that promote the goals of administrative ease and effi-
130. MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT, MILWAUKEE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF JOINT TASK FORCE INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE ELECTION FRAUD (2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/wie/pressreleases/pr051005_electionfraud.pdf.
131. See THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, ELECTIONLINE.ORG BRIEFING:
ASSORTED ROLLS: STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASES UNDER HAVA (June 2005),
available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/IfEBI .FINAL I .pdf.
132. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PURGED! HOW FLAWED AND INCONSISTENT VOTING
SYSTEMS COULD DEPRIVE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Files/getFile.cfm?id=1 6844.
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ciency while at the same time serving the interests of equity and democ-
racy. Such reforms will help to reduce the problems experienced where
there is confusion among elections workers about the proper handling of
felon lists, lack of clarity about felon disenfranchisement laws, misman-
agement of databases with respect to felons, and problems with ex-felons
not knowing whether or not they may vote. As more and more Ameri-
cans are coming to recognize, reforms are also important because of the
democratic values at stake. According to the Sentencing Project, 80% of
the public supports restoration of voting rights for ex-felons who have
completed their sentences, while 64% and 62% respectively support the
right of probationers and parolees to vote. 33 In the 2004 election, some
five million Americans-2.4% of the electorate-were denied a vote on
the basis of a felony conviction.134 This disenfranchisement fell most
heavily on African Americans-13% of black men cannot legally vote,
seven times the national average.135
In states that disenfranchise felons, the process of re-
enfranchisement upon completion of incarceration, parole, or probation
should be automatic. When a felon has completed his sentence, he should
be put back on the list of eligible voters, automatically re-enfranchised
through a computerized statewide voter registration list if returning to the
same location, or allowed to fill out a normal voter registration form if
new to the area. If an ex-felon must-complete a new registration, he
should be notified of that requirement immediately upon release. Courts
should notify counties when a felon's sentence is fihished so that the
felon status may be removed.
States should not impose a lengthy application process or require
the production of an unnecessary amount of documentation, nor should
an ex-felon be required to pay court fees and court-ordered restitution
before regaining his voting rights. There should not be a price tag or an
economic means test on the right to vote in the United States. States
should not require drawn-out reviews by the governor or state legislature
before an ex-felon can regain his rights. Furthermore, states should
eliminate statutory waiting periods and require corrections officers to
provide ex-felons with all pertinent information and assistance to regain
voting rights. 36
133. The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
issues_03.cfm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
134. Fox Butterfield, Two Studies Find Laws on Felons Forbid Many Black Men to Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A22.
135. Editorial, Felons and the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, at D1 2.
136. MARC MAUER & TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BARRED FOR LIFE:
VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION IN PERMANENT DISENFRANCHISEMENT STATES (2005), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf.
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States should also adopt statutes that specify and standardize
matching criteria for identifying felons in statewide databases. These
statutes should prescribe the use of numerous matching criteria, require
exact matches of felony conviction and voter registration data, and re-
quire that matches be double-checked at state and county levels. Match-
ing criteria should include first, middle, last, and maiden names, gender,
alias, date and place of birth, and driver's license number, if any.137
Purges should be done year-round, but end ninety days before the
election so anyone purged is given due notice and an opportunity to ap-
peal. As is done in New York, any individual to be purged shouldfirst be
mailed a certified, forward-able notification letter to the last know ad-
dress, to which he would have a certain number of days to respond be-
fore registration is cancelled (in the case of New York it is fourteen
days). The letter in New York includes a postage-paid card that asks the
individual to list any reasons why he should not be removed. 38 If the
individual does not respond, the state sends out a second letter giving
notice that his registration has been cancelled and providing information
about re-enfranchisement.' 39
The issue of felon voting, and the solution of automatic re-
enfranchisement of ex-felons no longer in prison, is an area in which the
values of administrative ease, finality, and ensuring voting integrity do
not conflict with the values of opening up the process and ensuring vot-
ing rights. Simply and quickly re-enfranchising ex-felons serves all these
interests. Administrators will have less work to do with respect to regis-
tration lists, there will be no concerns about ex-felons illegally voting,
and the right to vote will be granted to millions of Americans who have
already paid their debts and need to be brought back into the life of our
democratic society.
B. Polling Place Fraud and Voter Identification
1. Washington State
In terms of fraud actually taking place at the polling place, the
judge in Borders found that out of the millions of votes cast, nineteen
ballots were tabulated in the name of deceased voters and six voters
voted twice.140 These are the only kinds of election fraud that identifica-
tion requirements could have deterred or thwarted. Nevertheless, like
137. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 132.
138. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-402(2) (McKinney 1997).
139. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-402(3) (McKinney 1997).
140. Court's Oral Decision, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
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several other states, Washington passed legislation imposing stricter
identification requirements in 2005. This legislation ranks Washington
among states with very restrictive identification requirements, and serves
as an apt example of an area of election law and administration where the
dichotomy between competing values is false. The debate over whether
an ID requirement is necessary to combat voter fraud and the value of
ensuring eligible voters are not disenfranchised is completely misplaced.
A voter ID requirement does not solve the problem of voter fraud, and no
compelling, evidence-based value is addressed by this "reform."
Washington's new law requires all voters to present ID at the
polls.14 1 Acceptable forms of ID are limited to voter registration cards
and current government-issued photo ID, including but not limited to a
driver's license, state ID card, passport, tribal ID card, or military ID
card. Any individual who desires to vote in person but cannot provide ID
must be issued a provisional ballot.1 42 This was enacted despite the fact
that there was already a law on Washington's books that made voting
more than once, or knowingly casting a vote illicitly, a felony offense. 143
2. Rest of the Country
Many state and national legislators have alleged widespread fraud
at polling places in 2004 that could only be prevented by requiring iden-
tification in order to vote. A number of states have passed, or are in the
process of enacting, stricter identification rules. Indiana and Georgia
have just enacted legislation that requires all voters to present govern-
ment issued photo identification at the polls. 144
Yet the evidence points to the absolute contrary of the policy con-
clusions behind the drive for stricter identification requirements. While
much of the emphasis on ballot security and fraud reduction has centered
on proposals to introduce or change requirements for polling place iden-
tification, election officials in many states have said that the mail (i.e.,
absentee ballots and early voting by mail) provides the best opportunity
for those seeking to undermine the electoral process and commit fraud on
a much larger scale. 45
In contrast, there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence suggesting
that polling-place voter fraud is exceedingly rare. 146 Only six cases of
141. S.B. 5499, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.205 (2005).
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.84.650-660 (2005).
144. H.B. 244, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005); P.L. 109-2005, 114th Gen. Assem.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
145. See note 181, infra, and accompanying text.
146. Professor Lorraine Minnite of Barnard College, who has studied voter fraud extensively,
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alleged double voting were found in Washington. In Ohio, perhaps the
only other state to be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as Washing-
ton, a statewide survey found that of the 9,078,728 votes cast in Ohio's
2002 and 2004 general elections, a total of four were deemed ineligible
or "fraudulent."' 147
As Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox wrote in a letter to Gov-
ernor Sonny Purdue opposing the state's new identification bill:
One of the primary justifications given by the Legislature for the
passage of the photo identification provisions of House Bill 244-
the elimination of voter ID fraud at the polls-is an unfounded justi-
fication. I cannot recall one documented case of voter fraud during
my tenure as Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State that
specifically related to the impersonation of a registered voter at vot-
ing polls. Our state currently has several practices and procedures in
existence to ensure that such cases of voter fraud would have been
detected if they in fact occurred, and at the very least, we would
have complaints of voters who were unable to vote because some-
one had previously represented himself or herself as such person on
that respective Election Day. 148
This is not surprising. As Professor Daniel Tokaji of the Moritz College
of Law at Ohio State University recently wrote,
For the individual voter, voting fraud is a high risk/low reward
strategy. A voter who pretends to be someone else risks prosecution
There are no reliable, officially compiled national or even statewide statistics available on
voter fraud. Researchers working on voter fraud must construct their own datasets by
culling information about allegations, investigations, evidence, charges, trials, convic-
tions, acquittals and pleas from local election boards and local D.A.s, county by county
and sometimes town by town across the U.S. The task is painstaking which explains in
part why nobody has done it yet. Such a dataset is desirable because hard data are persua-
sive, at least with reasonable people. On the other hand, I do not think the lack of such
data means we can't observe patterns from the available non-statistical data and draw
reasonable conclusions about the low incidence of voter fraud in U.S. elections today.
Moreover, if fraud is such a persistent concem of those who run elections and a wide-
spread cause for concern among a large number of voters who believe there is a great
deal of fraud in elections, why don't government agencies responsible for election ad-
ministration collect statistics on voter fraud? Some ID proponents argue law enforcement
officials don't bother with voter fraud, they don't have the resources to do the investiga-
tions, they are under much more pressure to find the murderers, rapists and thieves who
commit more serious crimes. I've interviewed elections officials and law enforcement
people for my work on voter fraud who adamantly do not agree with this argument.
Email from Lorraine Minnite to Tova Andrea Wang (Apr. 23, 2005) (on file with author).
147. THE COALITION ON HOMELESSNESS AND HOUSING IN OHIO AND THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS OF OHIO, LET THE PEOPLE VOTE: A JOINT REPORT ON ELECTION REFORM ACTIVITIES IN
OHIO (2005), available at http://www.cohhio.org/alerts/Election%20Reform%20Report.pdf.
148. Letter from Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox to the Honorable Sonny Purdue 1-2
(Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id= 18651.
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if he or she is caught, and the state should aggressively prosecute
those who engage in such fraud. On the other hand, the rewards for
the individual who engages in fraud are meager. The anonymity of
the ballot-the fact that outsiders can't confirm who someone voted
for at the polls-makes it very difficult to mount any successful
scheme of widespread fraud, without bearing an enormous risk.
149
As Professor Spencer Overton of George Washington School of Law has
pointed out, political leaders and voters must think about balancing val-
ues. He argues that "[i]f only 0.01 percent of votes cast are fraudulent...
adopting an ID requirement that reduces legitimate voter turnout by five
percent hurts democracy."'1
50
It is also likely that identification requirements have disproportion-
ate disenfranchising impacts on certain communities. This includes those
less likely to have the requisite identification and those with less ability
to attain it-the poor, minorities, the elderly, the young, and urban resi-
dents. A June 2005 study by the University of Wisconsin found the fol-
lowing:
An estimated 23 percent of persons aged 65 and over do not have a
Wisconsin drivers license or a photo ID. The population of elderly
persons 65 and older without a drivers license or a state photo ID to-
tals 177,399, and of these 70 percent are women. While racial data
was not available on the state population with photo IDs, 91 percent
of the state's elderly without a Wisconsin drivers license are white.
An estimated 98,247 Wisconsin residents ages 35 through 64 also
do not have either a drivers license or a photo ID.
Minorities and poor populations are the most likely to have drivers
license problems. Less than half (47 percent) of Milwaukee County
African American adults and 43 percent of Hispanic adults have a
valid drivers license compared to 85 percent of white adults in the
Balance of State (BOS, i.e., outside Milwaukee County). The situa-
tion for young adults ages 18-24 is even worse-with only 26 per-
cent of African Americans and 34 percent of Hispanics in Milwau-
kee County with a valid license compared to 71 percent of young
white adults in the Balance of State.
At UWM, Marquette University, and the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, a total of 12,624 students live in residence halls, but only
149. Daniel P. Tokaji, ID and the Right to Vote, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ, Apr. 12, 2005,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/050412.php.
150. Spencer Overton, Voter ID Supporters Lack Hard Evidence, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/soverton/ajcapril8_
2005.pdf.
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280 (2 percent) have drivers licenses with these dorms' addresses
.... Over half of the adults of the 18-24 year old age group did not
have a drivers license with an address in their current ZIP code for
college neighborhoods in Eau Claire, LaCrosse, Madison, Milwau-
kee, Oshkosh, Platteville, River Falls, Stevens Point, Stout, and
Whitewater.151
A 2001 study by the National Commission on Federal Election Re-
form found that 6-10% of the existing American electorate lacks any
form of state ID. 152 A 1994 Justice Department study found that blacks in
Louisiana were four to five times less likely than whites to have photo
IDs. 153
Conditioning voter registration on any payment of fees is indistin-
guishable from imposing a poll tax and might be a violation of the Vot-
ing Rights Act. 154 The Supreme Court has held even a $1.50 fee to be an
unconstitutional poll tax.155
The argument that governments can solve this problem by provid-
ing free ID to everyone, as suggested by the McConnell-Bond bill, 56 is a
theory with no basis in evidence or fact. Even if a state provides a free
voter ID card, the issue of what documents a voter must present in order
to get the ID card remains unaddressed. Birth certificates, proof of citi-
zenship, and passports cost time and money to obtain, making the re-
quirement essentially a poll tax.Moreover, simply saying that all voters should get a free ID hardly
fixes the problem. To be effective, a massive and expensive undertaking
is required to ensure that all eligible voters-including the elderly, dis-
abled, and those who live in more remote areas-get the necessary iden-
tification. It is unlikely that the federal government would appropriate
sufficient money for such a project, and most states are not in a position
to adequately fund such a venture.
Finally, in the areas where free voter ID has been tried, such as
Michigan and Georgia, it has not solved the problem. Despite a program
that includes mobile vehicles from which election workers distribute IDs,
10% of voting-age citizens in Michigan still have no driver's license or
151. JOHN PAWASARAT, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE, THE DRIVERS LICENSE
STATUS OF THE VOTING AGE POPULATION IN WISCONSIN 1-2 (2005).
152. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERAL ELECTION SYSTEM, To ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE
IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 4 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/
ElectionReform/full If report.pdf.
153. Overton, supra note 150.
154. Letter from Coalition of Civil Rights Groups to Mr. John Tanner, Chief, Voting Section,
U.S. Department of Justice (July 7, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=
18647.
155. Harper v. State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
156. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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photo ID. A similar mobile program in Georgia, which now demands
that all voters provide a government-issued photo ID in order to vote,
was forced for financial reasons to limit its service such that a single bus
would travel to one location for a day or two at a time between the hours
of 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.-the heart of the work day.' 57
The debate over voter identification is often portrayed as emblem-
atic of the split between those who would maintain the integrity of the
vote and those who put a higher value on ensuring access to the polls.
However, this is clearly a false choice. There is scant evidence that voter
identification requirements effectively deter or catch incidents of fraud,
especially when weighed against the number of people that are likely to
be disenfranchised by significant voter identification requirements. 1 8
C. Problems with Absentee Ballots
1. Washington State
Washingtonians vote absentee in higher numbers than voters in
most other states, thanks in part to a state law that guarantees an absentee
ballot to anyone who requests one. 5 9 In 2004, 66.44% of the voters who
participated cast absentee ballots. 160 After the 2004 election, the state
legislature passed a bill giving counties the option of holding all future
elections by mail. 161 As of this writing, twenty-eight of Washington's
thirty-nine counties have opted for all-mail elections.162
Borders v. King County reveals two major problems associated with
absentee ballots in the Washington gubernatorial recount. First, there
were discrepancies between the number of voters credited with having
voted by absentee ballot and the number of ballots actually counted. In
Washington State, the law requires counties to issue an absentee ballot to
157. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RESPONSE TO REPORT OF THE 2005 NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 7 (2005), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
programs/downloads/ %20CFER%20final%20report.pdf.
158. See, e.g., Jay Bookman, Opinion, Rationale For Voter ID Law Fraudulent, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Oct. 20, 2005, at A 17.
159. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.010 (2005) (anyone can vote absentee); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29A.40.020 (2005) (providing that one wishing to vote absentee must request an absentee ballot,
and establishing the procedure for doing so). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.061 (2005).
160. Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, Absentee Statistics for the 2004 General Elec-
tion, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/absentee stats.aspx?y=2004 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
161. H.B. 1754, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (authorizing county-wide mail ballot elec-
tions, amending WASH REV. CODE § 29A.48.010, and creating a new section).
162. See Brad Shannon, Optical Scan Passes Test, Officials Say, THE OLYMPIAN, Nov. 4,
2005, available at http://www.theolympian.com/apps/pbcs.dllarticle?AID=/20051104/NEWSO/
511040346/1006.
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each registered voter who requests one.1 63 Before the ballot is sent out,
the county verifies that the voter requesting the ballot is registered, then
sends the ballot with a label bearing a ballot ID code. This code is then
matched to the voter's voter registration number once the ballot is re-
turned. 164 Once these two numbers are matched, the voter is said to be"credited" with having voted.
However, in several of Washington's thirty-nine counties, the num-
ber of voters credited with having voted absentee was much smaller than
the number of absentee ballots received and counted. The Washington
Republican party, arguing on behalf of Republican candidate Dino Rossi
in Borders v. King County, petitioned to have these extra ballots ex-
cluded from the final counts because they had not been verified. 65 Judge
John E. Bridges ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove that
the approximately 1000 uncredited votes were cast improperly according
to the standard he established during pretrial arguments. 166 According to
the Borders court, the fact that a voter had received an absentee ballot in
the first place was proof enough that he or she was registered properly,
and the extra step of crediting the voter at the end of the process was not
necessary to prove that the voter had cast his or her ballot legally. 167 The
discrepancies between the number of credited voters and absentee ballots
received were more likely the result of administrative mistakes than ille-
gal votes. 168
The second major problem associated with absentee ballots in the
Washington gubernatorial recount is that after the final certification of
the election results, King County discovered ninety-six uncounted absen-
tee ballots, Pierce County found sixty-four, and Spokane County found
eight; all had been misplaced following the election, but there was no
mechanism for reconciling the number of absentee ballots received with
the number counted. 169 The Borders court found no evidence of malfea-
sance, just sloppiness and flaws in the system:
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.061 (2005).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.110 (2005); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 434-240-190-200 (re-
pealed Sept. 19, 2005). See also Petitioners' Trial Brief at 1I, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-
00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2005), available at http://soundpolitics.com/PetitionersTrialBrief.pdf.
165. Petitioners' Trial Brief at 9, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://soundpolitics.com/PetitionersTrialBrief.pdf.
166. Court's Oral Decision at 10, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super.
Ct. 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
167. Id.
168. See id; see also Jim Camden, Ballot Total Best Available at Time, Official Says; Democ-
rats Attack Data Used by GOP in Washington Election Trial, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, May 26, 2005,
at B I.
169. Court's Oral Decision at 6, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf. See also Keith Ervin, King
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The Secretary of State's office received no information from any of
the state's 39 counties that any election worker either removed bal-
lots or added ballots. Specifically with reference to King County,
there is no evidence that the significant errors which occurred re-
sulted from intentional misconduct or someone's desire to manipu-
late the election. There is no evidence that anybody associated with
any of the candidates in the governor's race had anything to do with
causing the errors. There is no evidence that has been produced in
this Court to suggest that the errors resulted from partisan bias. Dur-
ing the 2004 general election, the various polling sites across the
State were populated by inspectors, judges, Accuvote judges, ob-
servers, attorneys, and the media. No testimony has been placed be-
fore the Court to suggest fraud or intentional misconduct.
Election officials attempted to perform their responsibilities in a fair
and impartial manner. There is no evidence before the Court to
question ballot security as to those ballots actually counted.
1 70
Washington State has taken major steps to address these problems
in the future. The Legislature recently passed, and the governor signed,
the Clarifying and Standardizing Various Election Procedures Act which,
with respect to absentee ballots, does the following:
171
* Requires that provisional and absentee ballots be distinguish-
able from other ballots by color paper or imprinted with a bar
code;
* Requires measures preventing provisional and absentee ballots
from being tabulated by poll-site ballot counters, calculated to
prevent election staff from mistakenly inserting absentee and
provisional ballots into mechanical vote counting machines
along with regular poll ballots-one of the problems credited
with causing the absentee ballot discrepancies outlined above;
* Requires a space for the voter to provide his or her phone num-
ber;
* Allows auditors to begin processing absentee ballots immedi-
ately upon receipt rather than 10 days before the election, al-
lowing more processing time for the growing numbers of ab-
sentee ballots received by county election offices-almost 70%
County Ballot Numbers Don't Add Up; 4, 000 Discrepancies-Review Finds Flaws at Each Stage of
the Election: Voting, Processing, Counting, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 25, 2005, at A 16.
170. Court's Oral Decision at 6, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
171. S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
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of voters registered in Washington are now opting to vote ab-
sentee; 17
2
" Requires auditors to submit two reconciliation reports, one at
the time of certification including the number of registered vot-
ers, ballots counted, provisionals issued, provisionals counted,
provisionals rejected, absentees issued, absentees counted, ab-
sentees rejected, federal write-ins counted, UOCAVA ballots
issued, UOCAVA ballots counted, and UOCAVA ballots re-
jected, and one thirty days after certification that includes the
number of registered voters, all voters credited, poll voters
credited, provisionals credited, absentees credited, federal
write-ins credited, UOCAVA voters credited, voters credited
even though the ballot was late and not counted, and any other
information necessary to reconcile the number of ballots
counted with the number of voters credited; and
* Extends general election certification from fifteen days to
twenty-one days. 173
2. Rest of the Country
Other parts of the country experienced difficulties with absentee
ballots as well, although not in exactly the same manner as Washington.
The biggest problem with absentee ballots was not so much in processing
them, but rather in distributing them, ensuring their receipt, and deter-
mining their legitimacy.
The timely distribution of absentee ballots was particularly prob-
lematic in Florida. Six days before the 2004 election, "[t]he Broward
County Supervisor of Elections office ...said it couldn't account for
nearly 60,000 missing absentee ballots sent to voters and that its phone
lines were being overwhelmed by calls." 174 The next day, The Miami
Herald reported that 76,000 missing absentee ballots would be re-mailed
five days before the election to people all over the country. 175 Thousands
of absentee ballots were sent out as late as the Saturday before the Tues-
day election. 176
172. Reed, supra note 160.
173. S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
174. Jean-Paul Renaud, 60,000 Mailed Ballots Missing, Broward Elections Office Says,
BRADENTON HERALD, Oct. 27, 2004, at 12.
175. Erika Bolstad, Gary Fineout & Amy Sherman, Missing Ballots to Be Remailed, Broward
Says, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2004, at A 1.
176. Evan S. Benn & Nathalie Gouillou, Absentee Ballots, Long Lines a Worry, MIAMI
HERALD, October 31, 2004, at Al.
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Not surprisingly, the American Civil Liberties Union and Florida
Legal Services filed suit in U.S. District Court requesting that absentee
ballots postmarked by election day but received after the election be
counted on behalf of voters who, through no fault of their own, were sent
absentee ballots so late that they were unable to vote. 17 7 However, the
Court in Friedman v. Snipes held that counting absentee ballots post-
marked by, but received after, the election would be a violation of Flor-
ida law, and that the law in question did not violate the Voting Rights
Act or the U.S. Constitution. 17
8
Florida's experience, and the court's decision in Friedman, illus-
trates the competing values that appear to divide those involved in the
debate over our elections system: the need for administrative ease and
finality on election day versus the value of counting every vote. The
court in Friedman ruled that because elections officials did not arbitrarily
or deliberately delay the sending of the absentee ballots but rather made
an administrative error, the voters' rights were not violated such that the
rules should be changed. 179 On the opposing side, voting rights advocates
argued that, when there is administrative error, a voter should not lose
the right to vote.
In this instance, voters ought not to have been disenfranchised. The
value of a legitimate voter having his vote counted should outweigh
regulations designed to promote administrative efficiency whenever it is
possible to count the votes without disrupting the system completely.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the right to vote is a "fun-
damental right." 180 When a voter has taken every step required under the
law in order to exercise his right to vote, widespread administrative error
that is remediable in a relatively easy manner should not trump that right.
Absentee ballots, as opposed to ballots cast at a polling site, are
generally more susceptible to fraud. 81 As noted by the National Com-
mission on Federal Election Reform, the
[g]rowing use of absentee voting has turned this area of voting into
the most likely opportunity for election fraud now encountered by
law enforcement officials. These cases are especially difficult to
prosecute, since the misuse of a voter's ballot or the pressure on
voters occurs away from the polling place or any other outside scru-
177. Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
178. Id. at 1368, 1382.
179. Id. at 1377, 1382.
180. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
181. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, To ENSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE 44 (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/99 full
report.pdf.
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tiny. These opportunities for abuse should be contained, not
enlarged.18
2
Concern about voter fraud through absentee ballots is bipartisan. In
March 2005, Kansas Secretary of State Ron Thornburgh, a Republican,
said that "[t]he greatest potential for abuse in the state of Kansas in our
election system right now is advance voting. We've got a situation where
any person may return another individual's ballot."' 183
Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox, a Democrat, told The New
York Times in April 2005 that she had not heard of any cases of voters
accused of voter fraud at polling places. Cox, however, said in the same
article that stringent voter ID rules at polling places "opens the flood-
gates" to "already rampant fraud in absentee voting."' 84 According to
Gary Bartlett, Director of Elections in North Carolina, "whenever there is
hanky-panky in elections, it's usually through absentee voting."', 85
Recent newspaper reports detail numerous incidents of question-
able, if not outright fraudulent, handling of absentee ballots. In 2004, the
South Dakota Republican Party hired eight people to register voters and
fill out absentee ballot applications1 86 even though the state GOP had
been accused in the past of improperly notarizing absentee ballot applica-
tions. 187 Illinois officials began investigating allegations of voter fraud in
January 2005, centering on thirteen ballots cast from a boarding house in
East St. Louis. 188 In the city of Passaic, New Jersey, three dozen voters
claimed they had been victims of absentee ballot fraud in 2003.189 From
2000-2004, prosecutors have brought criminal cases in at least fifteen
states for absentee ballot fraud.' 90 In the 2004 election, felony charges
were filed and then dropped against the mayor of Orlando, Florida, for
allegedly paying people to gather absentee ballots.' 9'
182. Id.
183. Tim Hrenchir & Liz Montano, Mail Ballot Mix-Up Illustrates Potential Flaws, TOPEKA
CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Mar. 31, 2005, at Al.
184. Ariel Hart, Georgia Voters May Soon Need Photo ID's, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A15.
185. Michael Moss, Absentee Votes Worry Officials as Nov. 2 Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2004, at Al.
186. David Melmer, Voting Problems Resurface in South Dakota, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
Oct. 27, 2004, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096409748.
187. Id.
188. St. Clair Prosecutors Join Feds in Investigating Voter Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6,
2005.
189. Bob Ivry, Absentee Ballot Abuse is Difficult to Forestall, BERGEN COUNTY RECORD, Oct.
4, 2004, at Al.
190. Michael Moss, Absentee Votes Worry Officials as Nov. 2 Nears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 13,
2004, at A 1.
191. Marc Caputo, Measure Aims to Clarify Absentee Ballot-Fraud Law, MIAMI HERALD, May
4, 2005, at B8.
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As in Washington, many states are greatly expanding the use of ab-
sentee and mail-in ballots. According to a 2004 survey by the National
Association of Secretaries of State, thirty states allow for unconditional
early voting by standard or absentee ballot. 192 Georgia passed legislation
in 2005 allowing voters to mail in a ballot during a forty-five day win-
dow without offering an explanation.' 93 Michigan has similar legislation
pending, 94 as does Missouri. 195
At the same time, some states are starting to move in the direction
of making the vote-by-mail process more secure. Oregon employs a
multi-layered system in an effort to curtail fraud. Ballots cannot be for-
warded; 196 the voter is required to sign an outer envelope, 97 which is
cross-referenced with a computer signature on record; 198 and question-
able ballots are put aside for further investigation. 199 Oregon required all
counties to file a "ballot security plan" beginning in 2002,200 and now
requires that ballot "drop boxes," which voters can use to save a stamp,
must be marked as "official., 20'
According to an electionline.org report, two bills are under consid-
eration in Connecticut--one would impose greater accountability on
those distributing absentee ballot applications, and the other would re-
quire anyone who assists a voter in filling out an absentee ballot applica-
tion to sign their name as well.20 2 A bill in the Illinois legislature would
require a voter's address to be included on a list of those who have re-
ceived and returned absentee ballots. 20 3 Indiana has already passed a law
that prohibits "electioneering" in the presence of those who possess ab-
sentee ballots, establishes rules concerning those who deliver ballots, and
adds new criminal penalties. 20 4 In Texas, a bill is pending that would
192. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECRETARIES OF STATE, EARLY VOTING SURVEY (Sept.
2004), available at http://www.nass.org/electioninfo/Early%20Voting%2OSurvey.pdf.
193. Sonji Jacob & Carlos Campos, Perdue Signs ID Bill, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION,
Apr. 23, 2005, at BI.
194. H.B. 4320, 93rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005).
195. S.B. 478, 93rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005).
196. OR. REV. STAT. § 254.470 (2001).
197. Id. § 254.470 (9)(b).
198. Id. § 254.470(10) provides only that the clerk shall check the signature against that on the
voters' registration card, according to rules set out by the Secretary of State.
199. OREGON SECRETARY OF STATE BILL BRADBURY, STATE OF OREGON, VOTE BY MAIL 3
(2000), available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/vbm/vbm guide.pdf.
200. OR. REV. STAT. § 254.074 (2003).
201. Id. § 250.470(2).
202. Dan Seligson, Absentee Ballot Bills Overshadowed by Voter ID, ELECTIONLINE WEEKLY,
Apr. 15, 2005, available at http://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/
xmid/33/xmfid/3/Default.aspx.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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make assisting more than one voter with an absentee ballot-with excep-
tions for officials, family members and others-a criminal offense.2 °5
D. Provisional Ballots
1. Washington State
Washington State law provides that provisional ballots cast in the
correct jurisdiction but the wrong precinct should be counted for those
races in which the voter was eligible to vote.206 Just as important, Wash-
ington's administrative code says that "[if] a provisional ballot was voted
because a voter failed to produce required identification, the ballot shall
be counted if the voter is otherwise eligible."20 7
As a result, Washington has escaped many of the controversies and
legal actions that other states have endured due to those states' more re-
strictive policies for counting provisional ballots. In addition, Washing-
ton's percentage of valid provisional ballots was the third highest in the
nation at 80%.208 While Washington election officials did not completely
avoid provisional ballot-related problems, the difficulties they encoun-
tered were more a matter of poll worker and administrative errors than
confusion or controversy as to what the proper policy and procedures
should be.
In Washington, provisional ballots are separated from regular bal-
lots and sent to the auditor for verification of voter registration. In the
2004 election, due to confusion at polling places, some voters mistakenly
inserted provisional ballots into a tabulating machine for regular ballots,
rather than submitting them in the required envelopes that are sent to the
auditor for verification of registration. 20 9 In Borders v. King County, the
court found that seventy-seven provisional ballots were improperly cast
this way in Pierce County. 210 No evidence was presented as to whether
these seventy-seven ballots were cast by registered voters or whether
those voters participated in the 2004 gubernatorial election.21  In King
County, 348 provisional ballots were improperly cast; of these, 252 were
205. Id.
206. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 434-253-047 (2002).
207. As amended, Subsection 7 now reads: "If the voter voted a provisional ballot because he
or she failed to produce identification as required by WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.205 (2005), the
ballot is counted if the signature on the envelope matches the signature in the voter registration re-
cord." Id.
208. THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, supra note 59, at 11.
209. Keith Ervin, Provisional-Vote Flaws Revealed, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at B 1.
210. Court's Oral Decision at 5, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
211. Id.
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determined to have been cast by registered voters, thus leaving ninety-six
unverified ballots. 212 Four hundred thirty-seven provisional ballots were
cast in King County without labels; after an investigation, it was deter-
mined that 358 of these ballots had been cast by registered voters, leav-
ing seventy-nine additional unverified ballots. 21 3
King County officials also discovered that 348 provisional ballots
had been inserted into the vote tabulator improperly and counted with the
normal ballots.21 4 After verifying the ballots, they found that 252 had
been cast by properly registered voters, leaving ninety-six that were un-
verifiable and therefore illegal.21 5 The Republican Party, on behalf of
Republican gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi, argued that these ballots
should be excluded from the election results, recommending a methodol-
ogy-rejected by the court-which would apportion illegal votes to can-
didates in proportion to the percentages candidates received in each pre-
216cinct. Because no evidence was presented as to the identities of these
96 illegal provisional voters or as to whether any of them participated in
the 2004 gubernatorial election, the votes were not subtracted. The court
found, as with the other illegal votes, that the problems with provisional
ballots were the result of administrative error and the unexpectedly large
turn-out of provisional voters, rather than fraud and intentional meddling
in election results.21 7
Washington has made efforts since the election to ensure that these
kinds of mistakes are reduced. The Enhancing Voter Registration Re-
cordkeeping 218 provides the following with respect to provisional voting:
As to signature verification:
* Requires the county auditor to notify the voter if he or she has
failed to sign the provisional ballot envelope or if the signature
on the envelope that does not match the one on the voter regis-
tration;
* Specifies that the auditor must contact the voter by telephone
and then by mail, stipulating that ; voice messages are not con-
sidered telephone contact; and
212. Ervin, supra note 209.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Petitioners' Trial Brief at 42, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super.
Ct. 2005), available at http://soundpolitics.comPetitionersTrialBrief.pdf.
217. Court's Oral Decision at 5, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct.
2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/629.pdf.
218. S.B. 5743, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
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* Provides the voter with the opportunity to cure the missing or
mismatched signature either in person or by mail so long as he
or she does so by the day before certification of the election re-
sults.
As to provisional ballots:
* Requires provisional ballots to be visually distinguishable from
other ballots and either printed on colored paper or imprinted
with a bar code;
* Requires measures to prevent provisional ballots from being
read by vote counting machines at the polling site in order to
prevent tabulation before the provisional votes have been veri-
fied;
* Specifies what information must be recorded on the provisional
ballot envelope.
* Requires the county auditor to provide a free access system so
that provisional voters can learn whether their ballots were
counted; and
* Requires that voters without identification be given a provi-
sional ballot.
As to ballot reconciliation:
" Requires that county auditors prepare two public reconciliation
reports: the first is due by certification and must include the
number of provisional ballots issued, counted, and rejected, and
the second is due within thirty days of certification and must
include the number of provisional voters credited with voting;
and
* Extends the certification period from fifteen to twenty-one days
to allow more time for processing.21 9
2. Rest of the Country
The issue of provisional ballots was a much broader and more con-
tentious issue in the rest of the country in 2004 than it was in Washing-
ton. The problem was not so much in the handling of the provisional bal-
lots as it was in deciding the more fundamental questions of who could
cast such ballots and which ballots would be counted. Provisional ballots
provide an instance in which choices do have to be made. Provisional
ballots can lead to more work for administrators during election time, but
at the same time have the potential to be a very important safeguard
219. Id.
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against wrongful disenfranchisement. Nevertheless, the problems caused
by provisional ballots do not outweigh the need to protect the right to
vote through their limited use.
Nationwide, the biggest battle with respect to provisional ballots
was whether a provisional ballot cast in the correct jurisdiction but the
wrong precinct should be counted for the top of the ballot races, e.g. U.S.
Senator and President. This led to pre-election litigation all over the
country, including in Ohio, Missouri, Colorado, Michigan, Iowa and
Florida. In several instances, the U.S. Department of Justice took the un-
usual step of intervening to argue that provisional ballots cast in the
wrong place should not count for any office.22 0 After several rounds of
litigation in these states, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ruled that HAVA does not require a voter's provisional ballot to
be counted if cast anywhere in the county; therefore, provisional ballots
cast in the wrong polling site could be discarded.22'
Under HAVA, the right to cast a provisional ballot and have it
counted is contingent upon being an eligible registered voter in the juris-
diction.222 As defined by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA),
jurisdiction means the geographic area responsible for voter registration
(usually the county), and not the precinct or polling site.223 HAVA
should be read in conformance with NVRA; therefore, if the voter casts
the ballot in the correct jurisdiction (usually the county) the vote will
count for those races in which the voter was eligible to vote (e.g. presi-
dent, senator). This was the view advocated by the National Commission
on Federal Election Reform (the Carter/Ford Commission).224
Such a definition of jurisdiction maintains the balance between the
right of every eligible voter to vote and have his vote counted and the
need for administrative efficiency and prevention of fraud. There is some
evidence that narrower definitions of jurisdiction for the purposes of pro-
visional ballots resulted in disenfranchisement in 2004: officials counted
70% of provisional ballots in the eighteen states where ballots were
counted or partially counted if cast in the wrong precinct but correct ju-
220. See Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, San-
dusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-4265, 04-4266);
Memorandum of the United States, Florida Democratic Party v. Hood, No. 04-395 (N.D. Fla. Oct.
19, 2004); Memorandum of the United States, Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp.
2d (E.D. Mich. 2004) (No. 04-10257); Michigan State Conferences of NAACP Branches v. Land,
No. 04-10267 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
221. Sandusky County Democratic Party, 387 F.3d at 579.
222.42 U.S.C. § 15482(a)(2) (2002).
223.42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(j)(2) (2002).
224. COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 35-36 (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/fullreport.pdf.
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risdiction. Of those states, eleven counted more than 50% of these bal-
lots. In the twenty-five states that did not count provisional ballots cast in
the wrong precinct, 60% of the ballots were counted. Of those states, six-
teen counted fewer than 50% of these ballots.
225
There are many legitimate reasons why a voter might appear in the
wrong polling location, especially in an election like that in 2004 with
millions of first-time voters. Voters who have recently moved may show
up at their old site, polling locations may change without notification,
and a voter's registration may be filed in the wrong place through admin-
istrative error. In no case should a provisional ballot cast at the wrong
precinct but at the right polling site be disqualified. In urban areas, sev-
eral precincts or election districts may be in the same polling location,
such as a public school. Voting at the wrong precinct may simply mean
that the voter went to the wrong desk in the right room. A vote in the
right polling site but wrong precinct should be presumed an administra-
tive error and the provisional ballot counted.
States should mirror the recent holding of the New York State
Court of Appeals:
When a ballot is contested in a judicial proceeding, the court must,
after determining that the person who cast the ballot was entitled to
vote, order the ballot to be counted "if the court finds that ministe-
rial error by the board of elections or any of its employees caused
such ballot envelope not to be valid on its face" ..... We can rea-
sonably infer that casting an affidavit ballot at the correct polling
site but at the wrong election district is the result of ministerial error
on the part of a poll worker in failing to direct the voter to the cor-
rect table, and instead providing the voter with an affidavit without
first properly verifying such voter's right to vote in the election dis-
trict.
The confusion surrounding whether such provisional ballots ought
to count had a significant impact on an election in North Carolina in
2004. At the time of this writing, that state had still not determined the
outcome of the race for school superintendent because of a dispute over
whether out-of-precinct ballots should be counted. After the state su-
preme court ruled that such ballots should not be counted,227 the state
legislature passed bills negating that ruling. A law was passed to re-
establish the legislature's intent that out-of-precinct ballots should be
225. THE ELECTION REFORM INFORMATION PROJECT, supra note 59, at 10.
226. Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. 2005).
227. James v. Bartlett, No. 602PA04-2 (N.C. Feb, 4, 2004), available at http://www.aoc.state
.nc.us/www/publie/sc/opinions/2005/pdf/602-04-2.pdf.
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counted.22s The Republican Party has filed suit in federal court, and the
matter of determining the outcome of the election is before a committee
of the General Assembly.229
Some election officials argue, and a decision in the Sixth Circuit
has stated, that counting provisional ballots cast in the correct county will
lead to voters showing up "at whatever polling place happened to be
handy, 230 and lead to increased administrative problems. However, as
Daniel Tokaji from the Moritz College of Law at Ohio State University
has stated,
No one is suggesting that voters should vote anywhere they please.
But the reality of elections is that not all voters do appear at the cor-
rect precinct. Sometimes, it may be that they made a mistake-for
example, they didn't realize that their precinct had changed-while
other times they may have been directed to the wrong precinct by an
election official or third party. There's no evidence of voters inten-
tionally appearing at the wrong precinct in those states that have had
provisional voting for several years, such as California and Wash-
ington.
The issue in dispute, then, is not whether voters should appear
at the right polling place: they should. The question is what the
sanction should be if they don't appear at the right place, whether
through their own fault or another's faulty information. Should their
ballot be counted for those races for which they were entitled to cast
a vote? Or should it be thrown out entirely? To do the latter smacks
of "gotcha" disenfranchisement, particularly given that the state-
wide registration database that must be in place by 2006 will make
it a simple matter to determine if a voter is registered in the county
or the state. 23 1
A number of state legislatures are considering legislation that
would clarify the rules governing the casting and counting of provisional
ballots.232 Although only a few address the issue of ballots cast in the
wrong precinct, many of these bills address situations in which someone
has requested an absentee ballot but then shows up to vote at the polls.
228. 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 2.
229. Gary D. Robertson, Ruling Appears to Favor Wade for Commissioner; It Doesn't Guar-
antee Her Win But Orders Certain Provisional Ballots to be Thrown Out, GREENSBORO NEWS &
RECORD, Mar. 18, 2005, at B1.
230. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
231. Hearing Before the Senate Rules Committee on Sub. H.B. 3 (June 15, 2005) (testimony of
Daniel P. Tokaji).
232. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Election Legislation Database: Bill Up-
dates for 2005 Legislative Sessions, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/taskfc/datastat.htm
(last visited Nov. 13).
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However, apart from North Carolina, no state has taken any specific leg-
islative action in this respect since the 2004 election.
The provisional ballot debate is an area in which the divide over the
desire for administrative ease and finality and ensuring voter access
clearly comes into play. Although there is no information that would in-
dicate problems in states where out-of-precinct ballots are counted, some
administrators argue that counting such ballots could lead to great diffi-
culties in preparing and implementing elections. Moreover, if more pro-
visional ballots are counted, the chances are higher that provisional bal-
lots might prove decisive in a very close election.
The case for administrative ease and finality, however, is weak
when compared to the principle of counting the votes of every eligible
registered voter. It is true that provisional ballots may entail more work.
It is also true that elections decided by provisional ballots, the validity of
which may end up in a court room in an extremely close election, are less
than ideal. But neither of these fairly remote considerations outweigh the
injustice that would transpire by throwing out the vote of an American
who is otherwise duly registered and eligible to vote for his or her United
States Representative, Senator, or President, but mistakenly happens to
vote at the poll site down the street.
E. Voting Machines
1. Washington State
The issue of voting machines has not been as contentious in Wash-
ington as in other states because a majority of voters in Washington vote
by mail, not by machine. Indeed, only 2% of Washingtonians vote by the
more controversial type of system, the electronic voting machine.233
Nonetheless, Washington does have its share of problems with voting
machines.
Washington State had been using punch card ballot machines
through the 2004 election. Through HAVA's machine replacement pro-
gram, the state received $6,799,430 from the federal government to re-
place those machines by 2006.234 That said, Washington's residual ballot
233. Press Release, Office of the Secretary of State Sam Reed, Is WASHINGTON Ready For
2004? State Preps For First Presidential Election Since The 2000 Florida Debacle (Oct. 26, 2004),
available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/osos news.aspx?i=yP7uyLq5hm58NYWauatZkw%
3D%3D.
234. Election Assistance Commission, Funding for States: Early Money Distributed to States-
GSA Statistics, http://www.eac.gov/early money.asp?format-none (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
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rate235 has been around 1% in the last two election cycles, likely due in
part to the low number of voters voting on machines.236
Several counties failed to conduct independent testing for compli-
ance with federal guidelines before the 2004 election even though new
software programs had been added to the voting systems, leading citizen
groups to raise concerns about the integrity of the election.237 One advo-
cate filed suit against Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. and his home county
due to the company's refusal to make public the source code of the com-
pany's voting machine.238 Sequoia, like many manufacturers around the
country, has refused to share its source code, claiming it is a trade se-
cret.239 This has led many voting advocates and election officials to de-
mand that manufacturers make their source codes open and reviewable
through legislation and the contract procurement process. 240
Concerns about the integrity of electronic voting systems led to the
passage of a bill requiring that by 2006 all electronic voting machines
include a device that will produce a paper trail allowing voters to verify
their ballots. 24
1
2. Rest of the Country
Given the great alarms raised prior to the election about the dangers
of computerized voting systems, it was somewhat surprising that the big-
gest machine problem on Election Day 2004 may not have been the effi-
cacy of the machines, but the number of machines employed. While it
may be easier to decide early on in the process the number of machines
to be allocated, and while it may be less expensive for government and
elections officials to provide fewer machines, these are not compelling
reasons to risk disenfranchisement.
The possibility of extraordinarily high turnout was evident months
before the 2004 election. Despite this, election officials throughout the
nation were unprepared. Consequently, lines and wait times to vote were
unacceptably high-and possibly a violation of voting rights.
235. The residual ballot rate is the vote error rate based on overvotes, spoiled or uncountable
votes, and undervotes, less what the best research says is the estimated intentional undervotes.
236. Charles Stewart Ill, Residual Vote in the 2004 Election (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology
Project, Working Paper No. 2.3), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/vtp_
wp2 Iv2.3.pdf.
237. Lewis Kamb, Untested Voting Systems Used, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8,
2005, at BI.
238. Jerry Cornfield, Suit Filed in Washington on County Vote Machines, THE MIAMI HERALD,
Apr. 8th, 2005, available at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=5750.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. S.B. 5395, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
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All over the country, voters had to wait in line for up to ten
hours.2 42 By the time the polls were about to close in Ohio, wait times
had gotten so bad that a federal judge ruled it was an abridgement of the
right to vote and ordered paper ballots to be distributed to voters still in
line, stating that "[p]articipation in this Democracy should not be as on-
erous as it is being made today. ' '243 According to the Columbus Dispatch,
thousands of voters were still waiting in line when the polls closed at
7:30 p.m., with the last person voting at 11:20 p.m.244
The worst incident occurred on the campus of Kenyon College in
Ohio, where there were only two voting machines. According to the
Beacon Journal, one student waited ten hours-until 2 a.m.-to vote.24 5
When the federal court ruling came down, the students demanded to vote
on the machines, chanting "No paper!" They were politically aware
enough to fear that paper ballots would not be counted.246 A study by the
Democratic National Committee of the election in Ohio found that 2% of
voters left polling sites without voting because the lines were so long.247
In Florida, a study of three South Florida counties by the Broward
Daily Business News found the following:
[T]he voter-to-machine ratio varied significantly among the coun-
ties. Overall, Miami-Dade precincts had an average of 195 regis-
tered voters per machine, Broward precincts had an average of 184
registered voters per machine and Palm Beach County had an aver-
age of 145. The contrasts were more dramatic between the 1,502
precincts in the three counties. Precinct 640 at the University of Mi-
ami had a registered voter to voting machine ratio of 347-the
highest in the three counties. In contrast, in some Palm Beach
County precincts, a single registered voter was assigned his or her
own personal machine... In Miami Dade, the shortage of machines
was at least partly due to the fact that the elections office did not use
the final voter registration figures-available 28 days before Elec-
tion Day-to allocate machines ... Miami-Dade used voter regis-
tration data taken from the primary election in early September.
242. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, NAACP, & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
SHATTERING THE MYTH: AN INITIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2004
ELECTION 8 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.lawyerscomm.org/2005website/features/pdf/
preliminaryreport.pdf.
243. T.C. Brown, Judge Says Long Lines Can Prevent Voting, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Nov. 4, 2004, at B5.
244. Turnout and Troubles: Waiting was the Hardest Part, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 3,
2004, at A 1.
245. Stephanie Warsmith, Ballots Cast In Wee Hours: Knox County Voters, In Possibly Long-
est Line In America, Wait 10 Hours, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2004, at BI.
246. Id.
247. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE VOTING RIGHTS INSTITUTE, DEMOCRACY AT RISK:
THE 2004 ELECTION IN OHIO 2 (2005).
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That 2-month-old data was used even though both the Republicans
and Democrats had conducted an unprecedented, highly publicized
voter registration drive that signed up thousands of new voters...
At the University of Miami, the wait times were as long as five
hours, and many students who had classes and tests left without
casting a ballot ... Of the 20 precincts where [Elections] Supervisor
Kaplan's office most severely underestimated the number of voters,
14 were in heavily Democratic Miami Beach. 4 s
It is notable that the distribution of voting machines within states
and even within counties varied widely. According to Edward Foley of
Ohio State School of Law, disparities in the number of voting machines
per capita might present an Equal Protection problem under Bush v.
Gore:
2 49
The Court there observed that "[e]qual protection applies" not just
to "the initial allocation of the franchise," but also to "the manner of
its exercise." This principle would seem to easily cover voting ma-
chine disparities that have the effect of imposing differential barri-
ers to the voting booths for citizens in different parts of the state.25 °
Three bills, introduced in Congress to address this problem, have
called for standards setting minimum numbers of voting machines per
precinct.2 51 Legislation introduced by Senator Hillary Clinton proposes
that a number of factors ought to be considered when establishing those
standards, such as voting age population, voter turnout in past recent
elections, the number of voters who have registered since the most recent
election, the educational levels and socio-economic indicators in the ju-
risdiction, and the needs and numbers of disabled voters and voters with
limited English proficiency. 5 2 These bills have little' chance of passage,
however.
The idea of establishing standards for the number of voting ma-
chines that must be deployed on election day makes sense, yet only one
state can be identified that has enacted such standards since the 2004
election. 53 Once again, the issue comes down to balancing what is easy
and less expensive against the necessity of ensuring that voters are not
effectively disenfranchised. It is obviously easier to base machine de-
248. Jessica M. Walker, Cover Story, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Mar. 28, 2005, at 8.
249. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
250. Edward B. Foley, Voting Machines Per Capita: a Bush v. Gore Issue?, ELECTION LAW @
MORITZ, Nov. 5, 2004, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/analysis/2004/041105.php.
251. See Voting Opportunity and Technology Enhancement Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 533,
109th Cong. (2005).
252. Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. (2005).
253. See, e.g., S. 197, Reg. Sess. (La. 2005).
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ployment on past information rather than relatively recent information. It
is also clearly less expensive to buy and use as few machines as possible.
But the trade-off for such considerations-making voting so difficult that
voters are simply unable to vote-hardly seems worth it.
Although it was not much of a focus in the 2004 election aftermath,
a national problem remains that voters, depending on where they live,
use voting machines of widely varying accuracy and efficacy. It is not
just a question of fairness; in light of Bush v. Gore, it is now a potential
254constitutional question. Many even argued that had the Kerry cam-
paign insisted on a recount of the punch card ballots in Ohio, there could
have been enough ballot spoilage to put the election result into ques-
tion.255 The Columbus Dispatch reported that 93,000 votes went un-
counted in Ohio in the 2004 election.256
In the 2004 election, more than fifty million voters were in jurisdic-
tions using electronic voting equipment, fifty-five million were in optical
scan areas, and thirty-two million lived in places where punch cards were
used. Up to one million voters nationwide used old-fashioned pen and
paper. About twenty-two million voters used lever machines.257
Optical scan ballots that are counted at a central location, rather
than at the precinct where they are cast, are of dubious efficacy. A recent
report by Professor David Kimball from the University of Missouri-St.
Louis found that in 2004, the residual vote rate for central count optical
scans was 1.6%, whereas the rate for precinct count optical scans was
0.7%.258
The security and effectiveness of the computer machines did be-
come an issue. A large number of problems arose with machines on elec-
tion day, including a number of allegations that voter's choices were be-
ing switched by the computer.25 9 Most important, perhaps, were the
nearly 4000 votes that computer machines mistakenly gave to Bush in a
suburb of Columbus, Ohio.260 Given the high level of alarm before the
election, these problems were treated by the press as minimal. Nonethe-
254. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
255. See, e.g., Juan Gonzalez, Ohio Tally Fit for Ukraine, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/story/257365p-220441c.html; Greg Palast,
Kerry Won, TOM PAINE.COM, Nov. 4, 2004, http://www.tompaine.com/articles/kerry_won_.php.
256. Darrel Rowland, Fewer Ohio Votes Uncounted This Time, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 4,
2004, at A 13.
257. ELECTION DATA SERVICES, supra note 64.
258. DAVID C. KIMBALL, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS, SUMMARY TABLES ON VOTING
TECHNOLOGY AND RESIDUAL VOTE RATES, http://www.umsl.edu/-kimballd/rtables.pdf (last visited
Dec. 16, 2005).
259. Brian Mooney, Voting Errors Tallied Nationwide, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al.
260. Thomas J. Sheeran, E-Voting Counties Say Election Was Done Properly, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 21, 2004, available at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=4378.
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less, accusations of manipulation of the machine counts were rampant on
the Internet for months after the election.2 6'
The data shows that overall, the voting machines worked better in
2004 than they did in 2000. According to the CalTech-MIT Voting
Technology Project, 1.9% of votes were not tallied by the machines in
2000.262 The same report showed the percentage decreased in 2004 to
1.1%. 263 Two states that had wholesale changes in the types of voting
systems used, Florida and Georgia, saw the biggest decreases in the
number of lost or "residual" ballots. Jurisdictions that changed their vot-
ing technology generally saw decreases in the number of residual ballots,
and those jurisdictions that went from punch card machines to DRE ma-
chines saw the greatest improvements in this regard.264
As a solution to the crisis of confidence in computerized voting
machines, most advocates are pushing for what is called a voter-verified
paper trail to accompany the electronic vote recorded by the machine.
According to an electionline.org examination of state laws and legisla-
tion, nineteen states now have laws requiring voter-verifiable paper audit
trails, or something similar, with varying deadlines. Of that list, legisla-
tures in nine states-Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, Utah, Washington and West Virginia--enacted laws in
2005. Eighteen more states have legislation pending.265
V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS:
A MATTER OF COMPETING VALUES
As the nation moves forward from the 2004 election and looks to-
ward the 2006 and 2008 federal elections, the debate over how to solve
the lingering problems in the system often seems to reflect a divide be-
tween those who value administrative ease, prevention of fraudulent
votes, and ensuring a timely conclusion to elections and those who value
broadening access and ensuring that no matter what it takes, every le-
gitimate vote is counted.
However, as is evident from the problems and the proposed solu-
tions in Washington State and throughout the nation, in at least some
specific instances, this sentiment is overstated. Sometimes this is because
misleading arguments have led people to believe they must make a
261. See Mark Crispin Miller, None Dare Call it Stolen, HARPER'S, Aug. 2005; Tom Zeller,
Vote Fraud Theories, Spread By Blogs, Are Quickly Buried, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2004, at Al.
262. Stewart, supra note 236.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Dan Seligson, Senate Set to Hold First Hearing on Voter-Verifiable Audit Trails,
ELECTIONLINE WEEKLY, June 16, 2005, available at http://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/
87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/xmid/130/xmfid/3/Default.aspx.
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choice between these values. This is most evident in the case of voter
identification requirements and the process of felon re-enfranchisement.
In the former, voter identification does not appear to address the problem
of voting integrity in the first place. In the latter, administrative ease is
compatible with broadening access.
In other instances, however, because of the incredible scrutiny to
which every aspect of the election system is now subjected, some have
lost sight of the democratic values that make the system work. Of course
there are limitations to how much elections administrators and technol-
ogy can do. This is especially true, for example, in the case where a
voter's registration simply cannot be accounted for and the voter at-
tempts to vote by provisional ballot. It is a legitimate question whether
elections officers can be expected to count such a ballot. Yet it seems
clear that the system should strive to push those limits to the farthest ex-
tent possible in order to ensure that as many Americans as possible par-
ticipate in the democratic process, and that every American that does so
has his voice heard and recorded.
Problems that voters experienced in registering to vote in 2004 pro-
vide an example. Voters who simply failed to check off a box providing
redundant information on the voter registration form should not have
been denied the right to vote. Similarly, voters who did not receive ab-
sentee ballots in time because of massive administrative error should at
least have been given a greater opportunity to have their absentee ballot
counted if it was postmarked as of election day. If someone was required
to show identification but failed to do so and voted by provisional ballot,
and that voter's identity could be verified by officials through other
means, that vote should have counted. Voters who appeared at the cor-
rect polling site-for example, a public school-but went to the wrong
desk in the room should not have had their ballots discarded. As we go
forward with implementation of statewide voter registration databases,
simple errors by would-be voters, such as transposing two numbers of a
driver's license number, should not mean that the registration is disquali-
fied out of hand.
In the same vein, a situation like that in Washington, where the out-
come is not immediately known and is the subject of litigation, is far
from ideal. Yet is it a better outcome to simply throw up our hands and
not take the time and effort to ensure that every vote that should be
counted is indeed counted? It is true that voters do not like the sense that
the election is being decided in a court room, but that is a false view of
what is happening. The courts are simply there to act as a last resort me-
diator for an imperfect system. In the best of circumstances, judges serve
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to ensure that the will of the people is accurately and fairly reflected, not
to decide the election themselves.
As we head toward the next round of federal elections, state elected
officials and elections administrators will continue to make many deci-
sions that will deeply impact the nature of our right to vote and the public
confidence in our elections system. As they do so, and as they learn from
the problems that beset the last two presidential elections, it is hoped that
they will strive to reach decisions that reflect not what is necessarily
easiest, but what is best for maintaining a healthy democracy.
